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REHABILITATION & REINTEGRATION OF JUVENILE
WAR CRIMINALS: A DE FACTO BAN ON THEIR CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION?
ALICE S. DEBARRE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although child soldiers that commit acts of atrocity and war crimes constitute
a minority' of the estimated 250,000 child soldiers worldwide, 2 the question of
their prosecution, as yet unsettled in international law, raises complex issues of
"culpability, a community's sense of justice and the 'best interests of the child'. 3
International law does not define the term "child soldier," and, given the lack of a
single or discrete instrument specifically concerned with this issue, no consensus
exists as to who falls within that category;4 the main issues being the minimum age
of lawful participation in armed conflict, and the level of participation required for
the child to be considered a soldier. One operational definition is that which can
be extricated from Article 1 of the Optional Protocol on Children in Armed
Conflict, which raises the minimum age of lawful participation in armed conflict to
eighteen years and refers to child soldiers as those children who take a "direetpart
in hostilities."5 Since this paper is concerned with child war criminals, there is no
need to define the scope of the notion of taking a direct part in hostilities, as it can
be assumed that any child soldier who commits a war crime has, in fact, taken a
direct part in the armed conflict.
6
* Alice S. Debarre is a young law graduate, recently admitted to the New York State bar, with a focus
on International Human rights and Humanitarian Law. She has studied law at King's College London,
Paris I Panthdon-Sorbonne, and the Georgetown University Law Center. Currently a legal intern with
Human Rights First's National Security Team in Washington D.C., Ms. Debarre will start working for
the International Committee of the Red Cross's International Law and Policy division in Geneva, in
March, 2016.
1. MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLIcY 85
(2012).
2. Press Release, Ex-Child Soldiers: From Victims of War to Protagonists of Peace, UNICEF
(June. 23, 2009), http://www.unicef.org/media/media 50066.html.
3. U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Right of Children: Impact ofArmed
Conflict on Children, 250, U.N. Doe. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996)
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/5 I/plenary/a5I-306.htm.
4. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 102.
5. Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I art. 6(3) U.N. Doe.
A/RES/54/263, (May 25, 2000) (entered into force Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Optional Protocol on
Children in Armed Conflict].
6. See UNICEF, The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with
Armed Forces or Armed Groups, (Feb. 2007),
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The ban on recruiting or using any individual under the age of fifteen in
armed forces or armed groups is settled international law,7 and, although it is still
ambiguous for armed forces, the minimum age is now considered to be eighteen
for armed groups.8 However, the question remains of what is to be done with child
soldiers who themselves have committed war crimes. International law provides
no explicit guidelines for whether, or at what age, child soldiers should be
prosecuted for war crimes. 9 In an international armed conflict ("IAC"), child
soldiers are combatants and will therefore benefit from the 'combatant privilege,'
which ensures that they cannot be prosecuted for actions taken during an armed
conflict that comply with the rules of International Humanitarian Law ("IHL"). 10
However, no such concept exists in non-international armed conflicts ("NIACs"),
where child soldiers are most often used, and in any case, no child soldier who has
committed a war crime, in an IAC or a NIAC, will be immune from prosecution
under IHL. 1 The only provisions relating to criminal prosecution of child war
criminals are Articles 77(5) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions 12 and 6(4) of Additional Protocol II13 that ban the death penalty for
crimes committed by individuals when under the age of eighteen. IHL, along with
International Human Rights Law ("IHRL") and International Criminal Law
("ICL"), contain little guidance and no express prohibition on the prosecution of
child soldiers for war crimes. 14
Despite the absence of a ban on the criminal prosecution of child soldiers,
none have ever been prosecuted by an international court. 15 Much of the reticence
to trying child war criminals in criminal courts stems from the fact that, given their
young age, they lack the necessary mental and moral development, and are
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples3lOlO7English.pdf [hereinafter The Paris Principles].
Principle 2.1 goes beyond the notion of taking a direct part in hostilities and defines the child soldiers as
.. any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed
force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls,
used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only
refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.
Id. 2.1.
7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 77, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter AP I].
8. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 5.
9. Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human Rights
Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 323, 335 (2007).
10. Erin Lafayette, The Prosecution of Child Soldiers: Balancing Accountability with Justice, 63
SYRACUSE L. REV. 297, 302 (2013).
11. Matthew Happold, Child Prisoners in War, in PRISONERS IN WAR 237-250, 243 (Sibylle
Scheipers ed., 2010).
12. AP 1, supra note 7, art. 77.
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter AP II].
14. Leena Grover, Trial of the Child Soldier: Protecting the Rights of the Accused, 65
HEIDELBERG J. OF INT'L L., 217, 218 (2005).
15. Paola Konge, International Crimes & Child Soldiers, 16 Sw. J. INT'L L. 41,41 (2010).
VOL. 44:1
JUVENILE WAR CRIMINALS
therefore more easily coerced or influenced into committing atrocities.16 Indeed,
they are less socialized, more malleable, and more docile than adults. 7 As the
U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons held, children have a "lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," which makes them more
susceptible to be influenced by outside pressures. 18 Furthermore, it is common for
commanders to give child soldiers either drugs or alcohol,' 9 thereby further
lowering their inhibitions. Alongside these concerns, the criminal prosecution of
child soldiers for war crimes also gives rise to more juridical issues. Directly
related to this question of a child's development is the difficulty of proving the
child soldier's mens rea. Does he or she possess the mens rea sufficient to be held
responsible for his or her war crimes? According to Article 8(2)(a) of the Rome
Statute, the mens rea required for war crimes is the proof that "[t]he perpetrator
was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict" and that the victim was a protected person under one or more of the
Geneva Conventions,20 which would have to be proven in addition to the
traditional mens rea required by the particular crime committed. Further juridical
issues arise, even were it to be found that the child soldier met the substantive
intent requirements for the commission of a war crime, as the court would likely
then have to look at the defenses of duress, 21 intoxication, 22 and superior orders.
2 3
Finally, the major problem with child soldier prosecution for war crimes is that,
while Article 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child calls on state parties
to set a minimum age of criminal responsibility,2 4 the little guidance that
international law provides leaves states with a considerable amount of discretion
on the question.25 The current lack of consensus of the different state laws on this
issue is an important obstacle, as it is unclear who may or may not be prosecuted
for war crimes under international law.
16. Lafayette, supra note 10, at 305.
17. HAPPOLD, supra note 1I, at 142.
18. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 366
(1993)).
19. HAPPOLD, supra note I1, at 142.
20. Elements of the Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Sept. 9, 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 at
108, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000), at art. 8(2)(a) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes]. See
also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, at art. 8(a)(2),
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
21. Grover, supra note 14, at 230 (although the defense of duress was rejected by both the ICTY
and the ICTR, it was included in article 31 (1)(d) of the Rome statute).
22. Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 31(1)(b).
23. Grover, supra note 14, at 230 (this defense was rejected in Nuremberg, the ICTY, the ICTR,
and the SCSL Statute but is available under Article 33 of the Rome Statute in limited circumstances).
24. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 40, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CRC].
25. HAPPOLD, supra note 11, at 246 (discussing the guidelines that can be found in international
law the minimum age of criminal responsibility should not be so low as to result in the punishment of
children who were too young at the time of the commission of the offence to understand the
consequences; even children above the age of criminal responsibility should be treated differently from
adults. He identifies a trend to standardizing the minimum age of criminal responsibility in the mid-
teens.).
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The reaction of the global community to this judicial uncertainty has been to
create and uphold what Mark Drumbl has described as the "faultless passive
victim" image of the child soldier, one of the goals of which is to curb punitive
policies and harsh measures.2 6 Despite this, and while it is clear in international
law that, when dealing with child soldiers, the standard is the "best interests of the
child, ' 7 it cannot as yet be said that there exists a customary international law
banning the prosecution of child soldiers. The Rome Statute is the only
international law instrument precluding the prosecution of an individual under the
age of eighteen at the time the offence was committed;2 8 and, although the Rome
Statute plays a powerful trendsetting role, 9 only a minority consider this to be a
substantive, fundamental rule of international law. 30 However, not only is there no
precedent in international law for the prosecution of war child criminals, examples
of such prosecutions in national courts are also extremely rare.3' More than
exemplifying the reticence to try child soldiers, this seems to point towards an
emerging customary ban.
As opposed to the incertitude concerning prosecution, international law is
clear on the fact that states have an obligation both to rehabilitate and reintegrate
all child soldiers.32 Reintegration has been defined as a "long-term process which
aims to give children a viable alternative to their involvement in armed conflict
and help them resume life in the community." 33 Measures of rehabilitation and
reintegration include Truth and Reconciliation Commissions ("TRCs"),
Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration ("DDR") programs, and local
traditional and cultural rites.34  Although the particular context will determine
which measure is the most appropriate, it is clear that both family reunification and
education are key aspects of the rehabilitation and reintegration objectives.35
Assuming the existence of such a customary international norm obligating
states to reintegrate and rehabilitate child soldiers, would this not, in fact, prohibit
their criminal prosecution? Considering that the purpose of such an obligation is
to reintegrate the child war criminals and other child soldiers into their
communities and to help them heal,36 how does criminal prosecution fit into this
26. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 10.
27. CRC, supra note 24, at art. 1.
28. Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 26.
29. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 119.
30. See, e.g., SONJA C. GROVER, CHILD SOLDIER VICTIMS OF GENOCIDAL FORCIBLE TRANSFER
- EXONERATING CHILD SOLDIERS CHARGED WITH GRAVE CONFLICT-RELATED INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES, 64 (2012).
31. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 117
32. The Paris Principles, supra note 6, §7.
33. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers:Global Report 2008, at 412
(2008), http://www.child-soldiers.org/globalreport reader.php?id--97.
34. Lafayette, supra note 10, at 309.
35. See UNICEF, Cape Town Principles and Best Practices art. 32, (Apr. 30, 1997),
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_TownPrinciples(1).pdf (covering family reunification);
HAPPOLD, supra note 11, at 110 (covering education).
36. Lafayette, supra note 10, at 309.
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process? The existence of international standards and protections for accused
juveniles, as well as the possibility, at the sentencing phase, to order purely
rehabilitative measures, would seem to argue for the compatibility of criminal
prosecution of child soldiers with their rehabilitation and reintegration. However,
this is in tension with the idea that a criminal trial undoubtedly leads to the
increased stigmatization of child soldiers, while causing them further trauma.
3 7
Moreover, the nature of the available safeguards and the supposedly rehabilitative
nature of a juvenile criminal trial are ill defined and insufficiently provided for in
international law.38 Finally, accountability does not necessarily have to involve
criminal responsibility. Therefore, there is a strong argument to be made
according to which a state's obligation to rehabilitate and reintegrate child soldiers,
who have committed war crimes, is incompatible with their criminal prosecution,
thereby creating a defacto ban on criminally trying these child soldiers.
II. THE EMERGING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL NORM BANNING THE
PROSECUTION OF CHILD SOLDIERS FOR WAR CRIMES
In conventional international humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law,
there is no clear prohibition on the criminal liability of individuals for war crimes
committed while they were under the age of eighteen. The 1949 Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols (hereinafter AP I and AP II)
contemplated both possibilities that minors could commit war crimes, 39 and that
they could lawfully be prosecuted for their acts. n° In the context of an IAC, article
77(5) of AP I prevents the execution of the death penalty on a person who had not
yet reached the age of eighteen years at the time the offence related to such an
armed conflict was committed.41 Although Brazil's delegate had sought during the
AP I negotiations to include the prohibition on penal prosecution of children under
sixteen in article 77, the decision not to address this issue and to leave it to state
discretion prevailed. n In NIACs, Article 6(4) of AP II similarly prohibits the
pronouncement of the death penalty on persons under eighteen. 3 The Geneva
Conventions, therefore, do not set a minimum age of criminal responsibility, and
apart from excluding the most extreme sentence, do not distinguish between
37. Megan Nobert, Children at War: The Criminal Responsibility of Child Soldiers, 3 PACE INT'L
L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 1, 34-35 (2011).
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 025&context=-pilronline.
38. See Analysis: Should Child Soldiers by Prosecuted for Their Crimes? IRIN NEWS, Oct. 6,
2011, http://www.irinnews.org/report/93900/analysis-should-child-soldiers-be-prosecuted-for-their-
crimes.
39. Lafayette, supra note 10, at 106.
40. Grover, supra note 14, at 219.
41. See AP I, supra note 7, at art. 77(5). This was an improvement on article 68 of Geneva
Convention IV, which prohibited the pronouncement of the death penalty on a protected person who
was under eighteen at the time the offence was committed. Indeed, in general, child soldiers are not
protected persons. See HAPPOLD, supra note 11, at 105.
42. Geneva convention, Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 307 (1974-1977).
43. AP ll, supra note 13, at art. 6(4).
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prosecuting adults and juveniles.44 Given that Article 40 of the CRC enumerates
the fundamental guarantees of due process that a child alleged as, or accused of,
having infringed the penal law is entitled to in judicial proceedings, and that
Article 37 bars capital punishment and life imprisonment without parole but not
incarceration, the CRC also seems to allow the criminal prosecution of juvenile
offenders. 45  Although these articles are not specifically concerned with child
soldiers and crimes committed during an armed conflict, nothing in the CRC
prohibits child soldier prosecutions for war crimes.46 Furthermore, the Committee
on the Right of the Child has advised states to report on "the criminal liability of
children for crimes they may have committed during their stay with armed forces
or groups and the judicial procedure applicable [...]."47
Whereas both these conventions therefore suggest that child soldiers may be
criminally prosecuted, a consideration of the statutes of the various international,
regional, and mixed tribunals does not give rise to an established and consensual
position. Indeed, neither the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") nor that of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") sets a minimum age of criminal responsibility. 4 For some,
this omission was intentional, suggesting that the court would be entitled to
prosecute a minor, and, should it decide to do so, that person could raise his or her
age as an affirmative defense. 49 The statutes' silence can however be interpreted
differently, for some it does not necessarily preclude the prosecution of children, 50
while others have argued that such a deliberate omission "seems to have been
premised on a belief that such a provision was unnecessary as no such prosecutions
would take place."'', Regardless, these statutes theoretically permit the prosecution
of child soldiers for international crimes. The Rome Statute, however, clearly
states in Article 26 that the ICC's jurisdiction does not extend to individuals under
eighteen years of age.52 Although Sonja Grover argues that this jurisdictional
exclusion relates to a presumed lack of criminal responsibility of individuals under
the age of eighteen, 53 there seems to be a general tendency to interpret Article 26
44. Grover, supra note 14, at 2199.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Guidelines regarding initial reports to be submitted by
States Parties under Article 8(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the involvement of children in armed conflict, CRC/OP/AC/I art. 6(3)( 0 (Nov. 14, 2001).
48. Luz E. Nagle, Child Soldiers and the Duty of Nations to Protect Children from Participation
in Armed Conflict, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 26 (2011).
49. Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Omar Khadr at
23, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1196), [hereinafter Brief of International Law
Scholars]
http://ccrjustice.org/flles/Brief/20of / 2tntemational %2Law/ 2OScholars%20as%2OAmici%2Curia
e%20in%20Support%20oflo20Respondent%20Omar%/o2OKhadr.pdf.
50. Grossman, supra note 9, at 338-39.
51. Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 56, 84-
85 (2008).
52. Rome Statute, supra note 20, at art. 26.
53. See GROVER, supra note 30, at 63.
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as a procedural, rather than a normative, provision.54 Indeed, it is said, given the
lack of a consensus on the minimum age of criminal responsibility, that provision
was the result of a political compromise, and therefore, not intended to set out a
legal principle. 55 As a result, it excludes the ICC's jurisdiction only. It does not
formally prohibit other tribunals, whether international, national, or local, from
prosecuting children for international crimes. 56 Indeed, Article 26 was arguably
not based on the belief that children under eighteen should not be prosecuted for
war crimes, but rather on the sense that this decision should be left to state
discretion. 57  As for the mixed tribunals, the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor ("UNTAET") Regulation 2000/30 Article 45 gave
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes ("SPSC") dejure jurisdiction over minors
from the ages of twelve to eighteen;58 whereas the Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC") does not mention
juvenile prosecution and restricts the jurisdiction of the Chambers to those most
responsible.59 Finally, Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) permits the prosecution of children aged fifteen and above. 60 No
general legal principle can be extricated from these different statutes, which, when
they actually provide for it, set different minimum ages of criminal responsibility,
and for some, under eighteen years.6'
Even what can be termed soft law instruments have not denounced a clear
prohibition on the prosecution of children for war and other international crimes.
Indeed, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules"), although they favor diversion to
community and other services, 62 they do not remove states' ability to prosecute
children. 63 Although the Paris Principles assert "children should not be prosecuted
by an international court or tribunal, ' ' 64 they simply dissuade national prosecutions
54. Daniel Ryan, International Law and Laws of War and International Criminal Law -
Prosecution of Child Soldiers - United States v. Omar Khadr, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 175,
180 (2010); Konge, supra note 15, at 50; DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 119.
55. GROVER, supra note 14, at 220.
56. DRUMBL,supra note 1, at 119.
57. U.N. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict, Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath ofArmed Conflict 37, Working Paper No. 3,
Sep. 2011, http://www.refworld.org/doeid/4e6t2f132.html.
58. U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/30 on the Transitional
Rules of Criminal Procedure sec. 45, UNTAET/REG/2000/30 (Sept. 25, 2000).
59. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 1, (2001), as
amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Cambodia art.l].
60. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 7(1), 2178 U.N.T.S. 138, 145; 97 A.J.I.L.
295; U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, (2002) [hereinafter Statute of the SCSL].
61. See id; Cambodia art. 1, supra note 59; Nagle, supra note 48.
62. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The
Beijing Rules") G.A. Res. 40/33, rule 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter The
Beijing Rules].
63. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 108.
64. The Paris Principles, supra note 6, 8.6.
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by suggesting that "[a]lternatives to judicial proceedings should be sought for
children at the national level."65
An analysis of the relevant international conventions, court and tribunal
statutes, and soft laws leads to the conclusion that child soldiers who have
committed war crimes may well be legally prosecuted, internationally or
nationally, and held criminally responsible for their acts. However, both
prosecutorial strategies in international and mixed tribunals, as well as the practice
of courts and tribunals, show a clear reluctance to have child soldiers criminally
tried, and a move towards a customary ban on the criminal prosecution of persons
under the age of eighteen who have committed international crimes.
There is no precedent for the prosecution of a child soldier before an
international criminal court. 6 6  Prosecutorial strategies have excluded such
prosecutions in international and ad hoc tribunals in which they would be de jure
possible. Indeed, the ICTR prosecutor decided that children from ages fourteen to
eighteen would neither be tried by the tribunal nor be called as witnesses to
testify.67 In the same way, the SCSL prosecutor decided to focus on those most
responsible and therefore announced he would not prosecute children.
68
Furthermore, while a seventeen-year-old was initially charged with crimes against
humanity and murder in Prosecutor v. X 69 his indictment was eventually modified
to state only the murder charge, which is an example of the burgeoning norm
according to which juveniles are not prosecuted for extraordinary international
crimes.
It has been suggested that there is an expectation by the international
community that domestic courts, being the more appropriate forum for such
prosecutions, should handle such cases. 70 Although there are no examples of such
trials in traditional domestic courts, children have, on rare occasions, been
prosecuted for war crimes by military courts, tribunals, or commissions, although
mainly under domestic law.7 1 Indeed, after World War II, a British Military Court
convicted a fifteen-year-old for his involvement in the killing of a prisoner of
war,72 and the Permanent Military Tribunal convicted two juveniles under the
French Penal Code for the war crime of receiving stolen goods belonging to
French citizens.73  More recently, the U.S. military commissions tried two
65. See The Paris Principles, supra note 6., 8.9.0.
66. See Brief of International Law Scholars, supra note 49, at 18.
67. UNICEF, Children and Truth Commissions, 17 (Aug. 2010), http://www.unicef-
irc.org/publications/pdf/truth-commissions eng.pdf.
68. Press Release, Public Affairs Office, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court Prosecutor
Says He Will Not Prosecute Children (Nov. 2, 2002).
69. Prosecutor v. X, Case No. 04/2002, Judgment (Dili Dist. Court Special Panel for Serious
Crimes) (Dec. 2, 2002), http://wcsc.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/ET-Docs/CE-
SPSC%20Final%2ODecisions/2002/04-2002%20%20X%20%20Judgment.pdf.
70. See GROVER, supra note 30, at 81.
71. Id. at 96.
72. Trial of Johannes Oenning and Emil Nix, British Military Court, Borken, Ger., LRTWC 74
(Dec. 1945).
73. Trial of Bommer, Permanent Military Tribunal at Metz, LRTWC 62 (Aug. 1947).
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juveniles for acts committed in Afghanistan. In both Jawad and Khadr, the
accused were charged, amongst other things, with attempted murder in violation of
the law of war.74 Although this is an offense under Section 950v(b)(15) of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, it is not, however, an internationally
recognized war crime, unless the accused was proved to be both an unprivileged
belligerent and to have killed a protected person or used a means, weapon, or
technique considered illegal under IHL.75 Since the charges against Jawad were
eventually dropped,76 and the government conceded in Khadr's case that there was
no evidence that he had violated international law in any way,77 these two juveniles
were not tried for international war crimes. However, the commission in the
Khadr case found that "neither customary international law nor international
treaties binding upon the United States prohibit the trial of a person for alleged
violations of the law of nations committed when he was 15 years of age."
78
In some states, minors can be prosecuted as adults or in adult venues for
particularly serious or violent crimes.79 In the U.K., two boys, aged eleven, faced
an adult public trial for the abduction and murder of a two-year-old in 1993.80 In
2001, Human Rights Watch intervened to prevent the execution of four child
soldiers who had been sentenced to death in the DRC; and in 2002, it urged the
Ugandan Government to release two former juvenile LRA fighters who had been
charged with treason. 8 1 There are therefore a few examples of children being tried
for domestic offenses other than war crimes in domestic courts. However, the
reluctance in both ICL and soft law with regard to child soldier prosecution
influences national criminal prosecutions. For war crimes in particular, the U.N.
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict encourages states to consider excluding children below eighteen
from criminal responsibility for crimes committed during an armed conflict. 82
Although generally not prohibited by international law instruments, the
criminal prosecution for war crimes committed by an individual below the age of
eighteen is unprecedented in international or internationalized courts and tribunals,
74. Defense Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to R.M.C.
907(b)(1)(A) (Child Soldier); United States v. Jawad (Military Comm'n Guantnamo Bay, Cuba June
13, 2008) [hereinafter Defense Motion]; United States v. Khadr, 7t7 F. Supp. 2d..1215, 1220
(C.M.C.R. Sept. 24, 2007).
75. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 27, United States v. Khadr, 717 F..2d 1215, 1220 (C.M.C.R.
Nov. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Brief on Behalf of Appellant].
76. David Frakt, Mohammed Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantanamo, 60 DUKE L.J.
1367, 1375 (2011).
77. See Brief on Behalf of Appellant, supra note 75, at 17.
78. EUGENE R. FIDELL ET AL., MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES AND MATERIAL 18 (LexisNexis ed.,
2nd ed. 2012).
79. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 105.
80. Id.
81. See HAPPOLD, supra note 11, at 141.
82. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 175 (providing the examples of Colombia, where not a single
criminal case has been brought against a child soldier, even within the juvenile justice system; and in
the DRC, which enacted a legislation in 2002 prohibiting the military courts' jurisdiction over children
under eighteen).
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and extremely rare in domestic fora. Furthermore, it has been argued that the
exclusion from prosecution of children under eighteen in the ICC Statute and by
the SCSL prosecutor, 83 as well as the failure to set a universal minimum age of
criminal responsibility, 84 has led to the general principle according to which the
prosecution for war crimes of individuals under eighteen is contrary to
international law. 85 Despite this, such a principle does not yet appear to have
crystallized into customary international law. Indeed, international law does not
prohibit the prosecution for international crimes of children under eighteen,
including child soldiers, 86 and there is no opinio juris establishing that such
prosecution, by an international court or tribunal, or any national court, would be
unlawful. 87  The U.S. has even stated that, given the fact that the Geneva
Conventions and their Protocols contemplate the prosecution of those under
eighteen for violations of IHL, juveniles may "face the possibility of a war crimes
trial., 88 Nonetheless, it is clear that prosecuting child soldiers for war crimes is
increasingly seen as inappropriate, and even illegitimate, as reflected in the small
number of domestic criminal prosecutions; 89 and that there is a move towards a
customary norm of international law, an "emerging standard," prohibiting the
criminal prosecution of minors.
90
Although there is a clear progression towards the ban on criminal
prosecutions of child soldiers who have committed war crimes, 91 both in
international and internationalized tribunals, as well as in national courts, that ban
is currently not a part of international law. However, it seems that in dealing with
individuals who have committed war crimes while they were under the age of
eighteen, the requirement to rehabilitate and reintegrate these children has evolved
into a norm of customary international law.
III. THE CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION OF REHABILITATION AND
REINTEGRATION
In both the hard and soft law sources that directly concern children and armed
83. See GROVER, supra note 30, at 63.
84. Id. at 70.
85. Id. at 81.
86. DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 126.
87. Id. at 133.
88. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, United States Written
Response to Questions Asked by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.S. Treaty Reports (May
13, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/105437.htm.
89. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 18.
90. Id. at 126.
91. Brief for Canadian Parliamentarians & Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 16 United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (C.M.C.R. Jan. 18, 2008),
http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/biblio/AmicusCuriaeBrief OmarK
hadr.pdf.
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conflict, the emphasis is on the child's "best interests. 92 Given the particular
context, the vulnerabilities associated with individuals of a young age, but also
their potential, there is a general consensus around the notion that a full-fledged
adult criminal trial is unhelpful to deal with child soldiers who have committed
serious violations of IHL.9 3 The efforts of both the international community and
individual states need to be focused towards these children's rehabilitation and
reintegration.
According to Article 40 of the CRC, which deals with juvenile criminals and
not solely war criminals, state parties should promote the establishment of
measures for children accused of violating penal law "without resorting to judicial
proceedings., 94 Article 40(3)(b) sets out different available dispositions such as
counseling, educational, vocational training programs, and other alternatives to
institutional care to ensure that "children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to
their well-being and proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence."
95
Indeed, Article 39 requires states to "take all appropriate measures to promote
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim
of.. .armed conflicts" and further emphasizes the need for it to "take place in an
environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child."96 The
Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict also obligates state parties to
demobilize child soldiers and ensure their reintegration as well as to prevent any
activity contrary to their rehabilitation and reintegration. 97 Although the ICTR and
ICTY statutes do not address the issue of child soldiers, and the Rome Statute
excludes them from its jurisdiction, Article 15(5) of the SCSL statute requires the
prosecutor to seek, where appropriate, alternatives to criminal prosecution and
Article 7(1) highlights the "desirability of promoting [a juvenile defender's]
rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role into
society. '98
The language in the relevant soft law instruments is similar and focuses on
rehabilitation and reintegration rather than justice and accountability, for
individuals who were under eighteen years of age when they committed a war
crime. In 1997, the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices were already focused
on child soldier demobilization and social reintegration programs, with no mention
of criminal prosecution.99 According to the Paris Principles, these children should
be "considered primarily as victims of offences against international law"' 10° and
should therefore not be prosecuted by an international court or tribunal.'0 '
92. CRC, supra note 24, at art. 3(1).
93. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 127.
94. CRC, supra note 24, at art. 40(3)(b).
95. Id.
96. Id. at art- 39.
97. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 5, at art. 7(1).
98. Statute of the SCSL, supra note 60, at art. 7.
99. See generally Cape Town Principles and Best Practices, supra note 35.
100. The Paris Principles, supra note 6, 3.6.
101. Id. 118.6.
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Furthermore, Principle 8.9.0 advises that alternatives to the judicial prosecution of
children should be sought at the national level. 10 2 The Paris Commitments to
Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed
Groups also put forward the need to seek alternatives to judicial proceedings
wherever appropriate and desirable, and the states entrenched in these
Commitments the necessity to treat children accused of crimes against
international law "in accordance with international standards of juvenile justice,
such as in a framework of restorative justice and social rehabilitation."1 0 3
In practice, this has led to the inclusion of provisions regarding disarmament
or reintegration in many peace agreements, such as the 2003 Liberian peace
agreement. 104 The requirement of dealing with child soldiers through rehabilitation
and reintegration has translated into the creation of both Disarmament
Demobilization and Reintegration ("DDR") programs and Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions ("TRCs"), and has also manifested itself in the use of
endogenous ceremonies or mechanisms. 10 5 The context and circumstances dictate
which approach is most appropriate, 10 6 and their effectiveness and success will
depend on how well tailored the chosen mechanism is to the particular situation at
hand.
DDR programs are often part of the formal procedure following a peace
agreement, although many are active in countries where ongoing fighting is taking
place. They are meant to progressively help combatants return to their civilian
lives and, for child soldiers in particular, the three phases of the program aid in
"'turning a child soldier back into a child.'""0 7 The first two steps of disarmament
and demobilization entail taking child soldiers physically out of the military
environment,'0 8 by collecting or destroying their weapons, disbanding armed
forces or groups and discharging individual members. 10 9 The final and most
complicated step, reintegration, is an ongoing process," 0 involving the return to
civil life in families and communities, and, hopefully, reinsertion into sustainable
employment."' The Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict has
identified several "overreaching considerations" that should inform any DDR
program, such as the need for separate and child-specific programs, monitoring
102. Id. 118.9.0.
103. Free Children from War International Conference, Paris, Fr., Feb 5-6, 2007, The Paris
Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed
Groups, Commitments 11,
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/ParisCommitments EN.pdf.
104. See HAPPOLD, supra note 1, at 114-15.
105. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 188.
106. See HAPPOLD, supra note 11, at 116.
107. Aaron Young, Preventing, Demobilizing, Rehabilitating, and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in
African Conflicts, 7 J. INT'L POL'Y SOLUTIONS 19, 20 (2007) (quoting PETER WARREN SINGER,
CHILDREN AT WAR 188 (Pantheon Books, 2005)).
108. id.
109. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 168.
110. Id.
111. See Young, supra note 107, at 20.
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and follow-up of demobilized children, and an emphasis on an integrated
community approach in order to ensure long-term reintegration."12 Through Sierra
Leone's DDR program, children under the age of fifteen were sent to interim care
centers and older children were either placed in group homes or occasionally
allowed to live independently." 3  All were given the option to obtain skills
training, agricultural training, enter the national armed forces, or go back to
school. 114 Although traditionally distinct from transitional justice mechanisms, in
2006, the United Nations published the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration Standards,' 1 5 which exhort U.N. DDR programs to include more
judicial processes for certain children." 6
An example of more judicially oriented mechanisms are the TRCs that
arguably enable holding children responsible for the crimes they commit as child
soldiers, all-the-while facilitating their reintegration into society. 117 Indeed, for
some, TRCs serve to find forgiveness, reconciliation, and justice, making them
preferable for prosecution. 118 However, it has been argued that TRCs render
former child soldiers insufficiently accountable, 119 and that they may lead to
stigmatization, despite the lack of criminal prosecution.' 20  Depending on the
conflict, a TRC may take different forms and have differing mandates. A TRC
may be empowered to identify individual perpetrators and assign institutional
responsibility; it may be tasked with recommending reform or even simply to
provide an abstract description of the conflict. The TRC in Sierra Leone was the
first to involve children, although their participation was voluntary, and their
individual conduct was not subjected to assessment, evaluation, or critique.121 In
Liberia, the TRC also involved children, although it excluded them from its
prosecutorial mandate.' 2 2 Although some have expressed uncertainty as to the
actual positive effect of child soldier participation in the Liberian TRC,'2 3 such
mechanisms are now considered to be a viable alternative to trials for former child
soldiers, particularly when necessary precautions are taken to ensure their
112. U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, 11 65, U.N. Doc. A/58/546-
S/2003/1053 (Nov. 10, 2003).
113. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 170-71.
114. Id.
115. U.N. Inter-agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,
Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards, 15
(2010), http://www.iddrtg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Operational-Guide-REV-2010-WEB.pdf,
[hereinafter IDDRS].
116. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 174.
117. See GROVER, supra note 30 at 264.
118. See Ryan, supra note 55, at 181.
119. Tanya M. Monforte, Razing Child Soldiers, 27 ALIF: J. COMP. POETICS 169 (2007).
120. See GROVER, supra note 30 at 266 (underlining the fact that TRCs are not always inherently
therapeutic and can, like prosecution, lead to the attribution of legal and moral responsibility by the
community).
121. Id.
122. See id at 278-79.
123. Id.
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therapeutic value and when they do not conflict with local methods. 124
Although child soldiering is a global problem, its challenges are inherently
local. 25 Given the many complex issues that child soldier reintegration entail,
particularly related to culture and tradition, special attention should also be given
to endogenous and traditional mechanisms. 126 These may constitute apologies,
reparations, or cleansing processes that will help reluctant communities in
welcoming back child soldiers who have committed atrocities in those same
communities. 2 7  In Mozambique, for example, in an adaptation of traditional
rituals, child soldiers were declared dead and a new, balanced, and harmonious
child was born. 128 Other such ceremonies and rituals have been used in countries
such as Sierra Leone and Uganda where they are said to have helped towards
reconciliation and community acceptance. 29  The IDDRS also recognize the
reintegration potential for child soldiers and are leading the way for their inclusion
in DDR programs. 1
30
It is clear by looking at the relevant international law and the practices in war-
affected countries that have had to deal with child soldiers, that rehabilitation is the
main goal of any proceedings involving these children. Different approaches, both
centralized or governmental and decentralized or community-based, have been
adopted in the effort to rehabilitate and reintegrate child soldiers.' 1 In Uganda, the
centralized approach assumed that child soldiers required specialized, individual
care before returning to their families and they were, therefore, sent to centralized
rehabilitation centers. 132  Other NGO strategies took more cultural and social
factors into account. 33 Although it is unclear which strategy is the most effective,
and post-conflict societies are often divided on the question of how to deal with
child soldiers, particularly those that have committed war crimes, 134 the consensus
that rehabilitation and reintegration is required remains unchanged. Considering
the CRC and its Optional Protocol, extensive state practice, and opiniojuris, 135 it
can be said that there exists a customary international norm that requires child
soldiers, including those that have committed war crimes, to be both rehabilitated
and reintegrated into their families and communities.' 36 The question is, then,
what this obligation entails regarding the prosecution of these child soldiers.
124. Grossman, supra note 9, at 351-52.
125. Young, supra note 107, at 19.
126. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 188.
127. See Lafayette, supra note 10, at 310.
128. See GROVER, supra note 30, at 277.
129. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 190.
130. Id. at 191.
131. See Young supra note 107, at21.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See GROVER, supra note 30, at 283.
135. Ryan, supra note 54, at 177.
136. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 324. (asserting that states have an affirmative obligation to
rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers into society).
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IV. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION WITH
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
In the Khadr case, 13 7 the Military Commission declined to answer the
question of whether or not being tried for alleged crimes committed when under
the age of eighteen is rehabilitative. However, if it is accepted, as argued above,
that there is a customary international law that requires juveniles responsible for
having committed war crimes to be rehabilitated and reintegrated, that customary
norm may very well constitute a defacto bar to their criminal prosecution.
International law recognizes that children should benefit from a particular
treatment, different from that of adults. Article 3 of the CRC requires that in all
dealings with children, the "best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration."' 38  For children accused of having committed a crime more
particularly, although international law provides no bar to their prosecution, it
ensures that, if criminally prosecuted, they benefit from special protections.
139
Article 7 of the SCSL statute provides that if children over fifteen are being tried,
that they be treated "with dignity and a sense of worth ... and in accordance with
international human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child."'' 40 The
CRC also provides for many procedural safeguards such as the right to full
information and understanding, 141 the right to legal advice and care according to
the age of the accused, 142 the right for the hearing to take place in a setting
appropriate to a child's understanding, 143 and other fair trial guarantees.' 44 The
Beijing Rules require the juvenile justice system to emphasize the "well-being of
the juvenile"'145 and the need for professionalism, training, and appropriate
qualifications of the persons working with accused juveniles. 1
46
The necessity of having juvenile justice standards is universally accepted. As
Amnesty International asserts, criminal action against children must respect
international fair trial standards, prioritize the best interests of the children, and
recognize their special needs and vulnerabilities. 47 The various national legal
systems recognize that, when it comes to criminal responsibility and the crimfinal
process, juveniles should be treated differently than adults. 148 For children accused
of war crimes, "compliance with the international standards relating to juvenile
justice is a condition with which any law of war tribunal must comply in order to
137. United States v. Khadr, 717 F.2d 1215 (C.M.C.R. Sept. 24, 2007).
138. CRC, supra note 24, art. 3(1).
139. Grossman, supra note 9, at 343.
140. Statute of the SCSL, supra note 60, art. 7(1).
141. SeeCRC, supranote 24, art. 12.
142. Id. at art. 37(c)-(d).
143. See id. at art. 40(3).
144. See id. at art. 40(2)(b).
145. The Beijing Rules, supra note 62, M 5.1, 17.1.
146. Id M 6.3, 22.1.
147. Amnesty Int'l, Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims, Al Index IOR 50/002/2000, at 9 (Dec.
22, 2000), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior50/002/2000/en/.
148. Konge, supra note 15, at 55.
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exercise jurisdiction over child soldiers."' 149  Do these international standards,
guarantees and protections make criminal prosecution compatible with the
obligation of reintegration and rehabilitation?
Many of the international instruments containing these standards, in their
provisions concerning the criminal prosecution of juveniles, mention rehabilitation
and reintegration. Article 7 of the SCSL mentions the need to take into account the
desirability of promoting the child's rehabilitation and reintegration. 150 Similarly,
Article 14(4) of the ICCPR mentions the desirability of "promoting [juvenile]
rehabilitation"'151 and Article 40(1) of the CRC of "promoting the child's
reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society.' 52 These
instruments, and particularly the SCSL Statute, seem to indicate that prosecution
does not necessarily preclude rehabilitation. 53 Some argue that while it is possible
to be both a victim and a perpetrator, it is also possible to prosecute and
rehabilitate. 154 Indeed, the well being of the juvenile, and hence rehabilitation, is
one of the primary objectives of most juvenile justice systems.' 55
Although procedural safeguards are an undisputedly important source of
protection, it is unclear whether they are rehabilitative and whether they will
further reintegration. This doubt is further enhanced by the fact that while the
requirement of special protections and different treatment for children in criminal
proceedings can be said to constitute a customary international law, in practice it is
not clear what exactly is required. 56 Given that there are no strict rules governing
the applicable standards, the question of the treatment of juveniles has been settled
in very different ways across different jurisdictions. 157 Therefore, until there are
both very precise standards governing the treatment that should be accorded to
children accused of committing war crimes, as well as explicit and definite rules
defining the ways in which that special treatment will participate and benefit the
child's rehabilitation and reintegration, it is hard to argue that criminal prosecution
of child soldiers for war crimes is compatible with their rehabilitation and
reintegration into society, as understood in international law and practice. Indeed,
without precise guidelines, a criminal process may be entirely oriented towards the
child's welfare, but it can just as much have more punitive objectives. 58
It seems, from an analysis of the above-mentioned international instruments,
that it is mostly in the sentencing phase that criminal prosecution can arguably be
149. Brief of International Law Scholars, supra note 49, at 26.
150. Statute of the SCSL, supra note 60, at art. 7.
151. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(4), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
152. CRC, supra note 24, at art. 40(1).
153. Konge, supra note 15, at 59.
154. Id.
155. See The Beijing Rules, supra note 62, rule 5 commentary.
156. See Konge, supra note 15, at 55-56.
157. Id. at 55-56.
158. Seeid. at56.
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oriented towards rehabilitation. 159 As mentioned above, Article 7 of the SCSL
Statute gives the Special Court the possibility of ordering counseling, community
service, foster care, vocational and educational training programs or DDR
programs, and does not authorize incarceration for juvenile offenders. 60 It is also
advised that detention of children must be a measure of last resort 16 1 and both
Article 37(a) of the CRC and Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights' 62 prevent capital punishment from being imposed on
juveniles.' 63  Instead of imprisonment, the prescribed sentence resulting from
prosecution can therefore consist of different rehabilitative measures.164 The U.S.
Congress itself recognized that "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation,"' 65 and this would be particularly true in
the context of child soldiering. The rehabilitative intent of such prosecution could
therefore be argued to be compatible with the customary norm according to which
these children should be rehabilitated and reintegrated. However, some
criminologists believe that the aims of the most effective and morally legitimate
criminal justice systems are first to shame the offender through punishment before
reintegrating him into society.' 66 Indeed, some argue that prosecution is "punitive
in and of itself," and that it is illogical to couple it with a wholly rehabilitative
sentencing strategy for child soldiers.
167
If indeed rehabilitative measures such as those proposed in Article 7 of the
SCSL Statute may be ordered, the juvenile accused of a war crime is nonetheless
subjected to a criminal process, some aspects of which may be difficult to
reconcile with the objectives of rehabilitation and reintegration. Indeed, regardless
of the special safeguards guaranteed by international law, the child soldier that
faces a criminal trial is at high risk of stigmatization and trauma. 168 A criminal
trial may be psychologically damaging, as well as humiliating, as the child soldier
may be forced to recount the violence he has engaged in and his involvement in
atrocities.' 69 This forces the child to relive the trauma and also delays the return to
any semblance of normalcy. 170 This, as well as the stigma of a criminal trial, can,
in turn, create considerable obstacles to the child's accessing effective community
rehabilitative services and in the longer term, his reintegration into society.
171
Indeed, after the conflict in Sierra Leone, both international and local children's
159. See GROVER, supra note 30, at 72.
160. Statute of the SCSL, supra note 60, at art. 7.
161. See CRC, supra note 24, art. 37(b).
162. ICCPR, supra note 151, art. 6.5.
163. This is considered to be customary law. Konge, supra note 15 at 56.
164. Lafayette, supra note 10, at 325.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012).
166. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (Cambridge University Press
1989); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 (1984).
167. See GROVER, supra note 30, at 74.
168. Id. at 72.
169. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 350-51.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 350.
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rights organizations were unanimous in their opposition to the prosecution of
children under eighteen, as they believed this would undermine their efforts to
reintegrate the child soldiers into their communities. 172 It has been asserted that
putting a child soldier on trial will endanger his or her reintegration and
rehabilitation into society, 73 and that it is inconsistent with the notion that child
soldiers should be seen as victims.' 74  From a more practical standpoint, many
post-conflict governments do not have the necessary resources to prosecute
children in a way that will uphold the procedural safeguards required by
international law. 175 Indeed, domestic juvenile systems often lack resources and
therefore breach international standards for juvenile justice. 176  Such a lack of
resources would lead to a criminal process totally unsuited to children, even more
traumatizing and stigmatizing, and completely incompatible with the obligation to
reintegrate and rehabilitate child war criminals.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the prosecution of child soldiers,
were it to uphold the required international standards, actually plays a role in their
reintegration. In many post-conflict societies, such as in Sierra Leone, there are
calls for justice and for the accountability of children who have committed
atrocities. In a previously violent society, prosecuting child soldiers may, in part,
facilitate the shift towards peace and forgiveness.' 77  Indeed, Amnesty
International believes that in some cases, child soldiers must be held accountable
for their actions.' 78 Furthermore, the Committee on the Rights of the Child advises
states to report on the "various measures adopted to ensure the social reintegration
of children," including "relevant judicial measures."'' 79 This shows that judicial
measures are not excluded and could signify a belief by the Committee that they
may even be helpful to a child soldier's reintegration into society.
The notion that criminal prosecution may help a child's rehabilitation and
reintegration, however, is evident neither from all the relevant international
documents nor from practice. In Section 7 of the Paris Principles, which contains
very detailed provisions concerning the release and reintegration of child soldiers,
there is no mention of any justice aspect.' 80 This separation could be understood to
172. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 35, S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
173. Grossman, supra note 9, at 351.
174. See HAPPOLD, supra note 11, at 5.
175. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 350.
176. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 147, at 9.
177. See Grover, supra note 14, at 236. Indeed, although Grover does not argue for child soldier
prosecution, she identifies the positive educative functions it may have (if the identity of the accused is
protected), as well as its potential to facilitate national reconciliation and therefore child soldier
reintegration.
178. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 147, at 2.
179. U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Guidelines Regarding Initial Reports of State Parties
of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, art. 6(3), U.N. Doc. CRC/OP/AC/1 (Oct. 12, 2001).
180. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 113.
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imply that justice is to operate separately from release and reintegration. 181 This
was exemplified in Liberia's TRC, despite its prosecutorial agenda, where the TRC
would not recommend for prosecution those who cooperated and admitted their
wrongs.182 Although this did not concern children, it shows that the criminal
process was considered to be separate from the objectives of rehabilitation and
later reintegration of those who had committed war crimes.
Furthermore, the consequences of trauma and stigmatization do appear as an
overriding issue, and considering these, it assuredly seems more appropriate to
avoid criminal prosecution and instead to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child
soldiers. However, the complete separation of criminal prosecution, rehabilitation,
and reintegration does not entail a foregoing of justice and accountability. Indeed,
these goals and motivations can be incorporated into rehabilitation and
reintegration mechanisms, such as the TRCs or endogenous ceremonies.183 It is
argued that "[t]ransitional justice processes outside of courtrooms and jailhouses
can enhance reintegration, reconciliation, restoration, and social repair even in the
very toughest cases - such as with child soldiers."' 184 Such processes have
numerous benefits, both for the community, in which it redresses pain, expiates
resentment and restores a center of gravity, and for the children, as it will expose
the crimes committed against them, and help dissipate the stigma of their
association with armed forces or armed groups.' 
85
Child war criminals are ill suited for the criminal process. In the context of an
armed conflict, every right of the child is violated; 186 he or she is taken away from
their family, and is deprived of their right to a normal physical and emotional
development.' 87 Even considering the different and protective treatment they are
entitled to under international law (when it can be afforded by the forum in which
they are being tried), the arguments for the incompatibility of criminal prosecution
with the objectives of rehabilitation and reintegration of the child soldier are
strong. Indeed, some recognized this incompatibility when the United States
decided to put the young Khadr on trial, arguing, "the policy of the United States
to detain and prosecute juveniles for war crimes is inconsistent with the United
States' obligations to rehabilitate and reintegrate child soldiers."188 Whatever the
form of the criminal trial, and even assuming the existence of a bar on punitive
sentencing measures and clear, binding rehabilitative standards, it seems like such
a trial would remain an obstacle to an accused juvenile's rehabilitation and
reintegration.
181. id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 200.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Konge, supra note 15, at 65.
187. Lafayette, supra note 10, at 309.
188. Ryan, supra note 54, at 175.
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V. CONCLUSION
The recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed conflict is prohibited in
international law. Unfortunately, the scourge of child soldiering remains an
endemic problem around the world, and in almost every single armed conflict.
While the image of the child soldier as a victim has, in recent years, dominated the
international discourse, there have been several examples of juveniles committing
wartime atrocities. Although no child soldier has ever been prosecuted in an
international court, the question of how to deal with this small minority of juvenile
war crime perpetrators remains unsettled.
This paper argues that there is, as yet, no customary international norm
banning the prosecution of child soldiers for war crimes. However, as this paper
suggested, states do have a customary obligation to rehabilitate and reintegrate
children who have been recruited and used in armed conflicts and that this
relatively recent norm constitutes, in fact, a bar to the criminal prosecution of
juveniles accused of having committed war crimes.
Indeed, Article 26 of the 1998 Rome Statute has been described as "affirming
an emerging consensus that international courts and tribunals should not prosecute
children under 18 for international crimes,"'189 and as underscoring the "tendency
towards an international legal status of minors as exempt from criminal liability
and prosecution for war crimes." 190 Until the prohibition of the prosecution of
children for war crimes matures into a customary norm of international law, these
children are still susceptible to be put on trial. The above-mentioned international
instruments ensure that children benefit from the safeguards that international law
provides any accused individual, in addition to more child-specific ones. They
further ensure that children will benefit from a different, ideally entirely
rehabilitative sentencing regime. It seems undisputed that the best interests of
these children be consistently taken into account, with the ultimate goal of
rehabilitating and reintegrating them into their societies.
This obligation to rehabilitate and reintegrate can well be said to have
matured into a customary international norm. The consequences of this on
criminal prosecution are important, and may go so far as to constitute, as argued
above, a de facto prohibition. Although special consideration is given in
international law to children accused of war crimes, these may be insufficiently
precise and developed to ensure that all these children benefit from the treatment
that will most ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration. Indeed, the trauma and
stigma associated with the criminal trial are not small obstacles. Furthermore, the
problem of the need for accountability, in the sense that it may help in the
reintegration process, can be resolved by the use of transitional justice processes,
without the harsh structure of the criminal trial. If the goal is purely to rehabilitate
and reintegrate these children, the criminal trial is not the appropriate venue.
189. See DRUMBL, supra note 1, at 121.
190. See Brief of International Law Scholars, supra note 49, at 19.
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A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO PRISONERS' RIGHTS IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
FRANCESCO SEATZU AND SIMONA FANNI
I. INTRODUCTION
In its landmark decision of 1984 on the Campbell and Fell case, the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") correctly observed that: "justice
cannot stop at the prison gate." 2
This statement perfectly captured the rationale for a human rights approach to
prison management. It also vividly expresses the auspices of all the actors
involved in ensuring respect for human rights in prisons and similar institutions:
public authorities, civil society organizations, and prominently, judicial and quasi-
judicial human rights bodies. The ECtHR's remark also helps to understand why
legal scholars from all countries have produced detailed commentaries and critical
examinations of the rules of international law, including the numerous non-binding
international standards, guidelines, and provisions applying directly to the prison
sector or intended to provide protection in cases where the detainees' rights are at
risk.3 The international community clearly feels the need to identify international
standards on the protection of the fundamental rights of detainees.
4
This need stems firstly from the fact that a number of monitoring bodies-
including the ECtHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("ACtHR"), 5
but not the United Nations human rights bodies 6 -have usually been partially or
sometimes even totally unaware of their practical significance for the detainee
population and have therefore not exercised their functions with full effectiveness.
* Professor Francesco Seatzu is currently a professor of International and European Union Law at the
Univeresity of Calgiari, Italy. Simona Fanni is currenlty a teaching assistant in the Department of Law
at the University of Calgiari, Italy. This article is the result of joint efforts and discussions of the
authors who together wrote the Introduction. Professor Seatzu is responsible for Sections 1I and III and
Simona Fanni is responsible for Sections IV and V.
1. Campbell v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1984).
2. Id. at 30.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"]} (last
visited Sept. 20, 2015); INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).
6. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights And Prisons
Manual on Human Rights Training for Prison Officials, U.N. Doe. HRIP/PT/ 11 (2005),
http://www.ohehr.orgfDocuments/Publications/training I I en.pdf.
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Secondly, and more significantly, the identification and subsequent application of
those standards, including the results of the Council of Europe's standard-setting
work in the area of the protection of detainees' fundamental rights, 7 have
significant consequences for the treatment of detainees inside prisons. Such
standards (as a whole) can help courts and quasi-jurisdictional bodies operating at
both national and supranational levels to ensure effective respect of human rights
and fundamental freedoms for detainees. Although the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners ("SMR"),8 the European Prison
Rules ("EPR"), 9 the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons
Deprived of Their Liberty in the Americas, 10 the United Nations Draft Charter on
the Fundamental Rights of Prisoners adopted by the United Nations Commission
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2003," I and other similar documents
only have the force of policy guidelines; 12 they are largely incorporated in the
relevant detention provisions of various international human rights treaties,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), 3 the
7. Incidentally, since the early 1960s the Council of Europe has issued a number of soft law
rules addressing particular aspects of prison life and specific rights of detainees, including Resolution
(62)2 on electoral, civil and social rights of prisoners, Resolution (82)16 on prison leave, Resolution
(82)17 on the custody and treatment of dangerous prisoners, the Resolution (84)11 concerning
information about the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Resolution (89)12 on
education in prison and-Recommendation(92)l 8 concerning the practical application of the Convention
on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Minimum Corpus of the Council of
Europe standards, Doc. RL-BU(2008)2, 16, 19-20 (2008),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/rapports/RL-BU U 2008 2MinimumCorpus en.pdf;
BtATRICE BELDA, LES DROITS DE L'HOMMES DES PERSONNES PRIVES DE LIBERTL: CONTRIBUTION A
L'ETUDE DU POUVOIR NORMATIF DE LA COUR EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (Bruylant
2010); Isabelle Berro-Lefrvre, Les conditions de vie en dttention et la CEDH, in IN HONOREM
CORNELIU BIRsAN 715-724 (Adriana Almdan ed., 2013).
8. U.N. Economic and Social Council, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(Aug. 30, 1955), http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3ae6b36e8 [hereinafter
Standard Minimum Rules].
9. Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee
of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules (Jan. 11, 2006),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/43 f3134810.html [hereinafter European Prison Rules].
10. Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Resolution 1/08, Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of
Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, (ser. A) No. 26 (Mar. 13, 2008),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/48732afa2.html [hereinafter Principles and Best Practices].
11. U.N. Comm'n on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, For Human Dignity-Towards the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 15/2003/CRP.9 (May 16-18, 2003).
12. See also Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 21, 23 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (stressing that, "drawing a formal distinction between hard
and soft obligations is less important than understanding the processes at work within the law-making
environment and the products that flow from it."); see also, Humberto Cantfi-Rivera, The Expansion of
International Law Beyond Treaties, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (last visited Aug. 21,
2015), http://www.asil.org/blogs/expansion-intemational-law-beyond-treaties-agora-end-treaties
(stressing that, "[s]oft law has established itself as a form of international law that serves as a driving
vehicle to adopt standards, resolutions, and principles that might not be ripe enough for adoption as a
conventional text, that is, of a formally binding nature for the ratifying States.").
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. No. E, 95-
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United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), 14 the European Convention on
Human Rights ("ECHR"), 5 and the American Convention on Human Rights
("ACHR").I 6 Finally, if consistently applied by national and supra-national courts,
these standards, guidelines, and principles may greatly contribute to building a
body of consistent case law on detainees' rights under the international human
rights conventions including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"),' 7 though there is no specific reference to detention
made in the ICESCR. The main reason for their potential contribution is the fact
that these soft law instruments (unlike international human rights treaties which
lack specific rules addressed to detainees and prisoners as a vulnerable group)' I
embrace a considerable set of issues related to detention conditions-
accommodation (for instance, overcrowding, hygiene, sanitary facilities, food, and
clothing), discipline and punishment, legal counsel, and free communication in
general, health and medical services, work, and recreation.19 While perhaps not
essential, building such a body of 'jurisprudence constante' would certainly be
useful, since several states are parties simultaneously to the ICCPR, the CAT, the
ECHR, and the ACHR.2°
Although the international law standards on the protection of detainees'
fundamental rights have been the subject of numerous peer-reviewed articles and
at least one monograph in French, 2 ' to date, very few contributions have
investigated in depth the reasons behind the different approaches taken by the
international monitoring bodies currently operating within the main international
legal instruments for the protection of human rights.
2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
14. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. no. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force June 26, 1987).
15. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR signed on 4
November 1950 in Rome and entered into force in 1953; all Council of Europe Member States party to
it, i.e. forty-seven states) [hereinafter ECHRI.
16. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
17. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
18. See Alphonse Spielmann, Les D4teneus et Leurs Droits (de I'Homme), in LES DROITS DE
['HOMME AU SEUIL DU TROISIEME MILLENAIRE: MELANGES EN HOMMAGE P& PIERRE LAMBERT 777-88
(Bruylant, 2000).
19. See Jiri Toman, The Treatment of Prisoners: Development of Legal Instruments and Quasi-
Legal Standards, in LIVING LAW OF NATIONS: ESSAYS ON REFUGEES, MINORITIES, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS: IN MEMORY OF ATLE GRAHL-
MADSEN 421-439 (Gudmundur Alfredsson, Peter Macalister-Smith, Kehl-am-Rhein eds. N.P. Engel,
1996).
20. Id.
21. See JIM MURDOCH, LE TRAITEMENT DES DETENUS: CRIT RES EUROPFENS (Editions du
Conseil de I'Europe ed., 2007).
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This paper aims firstly at assessing, and subsequently comparing and
contrasting, the respective contribution of the ECtHR, the IACtHR, and the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights ("IACommHR") to the widespread
success of the values embodied in international legal instruments on the protection
of detainees' rights. As Professor Thomas Buergenthal indirectly suggests, this
type of comparative approach to the topic is strongly advisable because "although
the American Convention is modelled on the European Convention, it departs from
or improves upon the latter in a number of important respects. 22 In this paper, an
empirical analysis is conducted on the compliance of the judicial decisions and
advisory opinions of the two regional human rights courts in Europe and the
Americas with the international standards on the protection of detainees' rights.
This requires comparative study of the influence of those legal instruments on the
case law of the ECtHR and the IACtHR. To do so, this paper starts with a brief
discussion of the SMR, followed by examination of the EPR, the Principles and
Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of their Liberty in the
Americas, and the Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa.
I1. A SURVEY OF THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON THE
PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF DETAINEES
To ascertain and assess critically the relationship between detention
provisions in the regional human rights conventions and international standards
and guidelines on the protection of the fundamental rights of detainees, it is useful
to consider those standards and guidelines that have succeeded in clarifying the
most difficult issues that arise from a human rights approach to prison
management.
A broad array of international standards on the protection of the fundamental
rights of detainees have existed for the international community since the early
1950s. 23  The historical origins and main features of the standards that are,
objectively speaking, the most useful for interpreting and applying the articles on
detention in the ECHR and ACHR are briefly outlined below.
The first modem (non-legally binding) international standards for the
protection of the rights of detainees were adopted by the United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955 and were
approved by the Economic and Social Council in its resolutions of 31 July 1957
22. See Thomas Buergenthal, The American and European Conventions on Human Rights:
Similarities and Differences, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 155 (1981).
23. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3452(XXX), 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/30/3452, Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 9, 1975); G.A. Res. 40/33, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33, United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules")
(Nov. 29, 1985); G.A. Res. 43/173, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173, Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Dec. 9, 1988); G.A. Res.
45/111, 1-11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/111, Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (Dec. 14,
1990).
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and 13 May 1977.2 4 The most noteworthy aspects of these standards-the SMR-
are their expansion on and detailed elaboration of a wide range of fundamental
rights, including certain social and economic rights, and their reference to human
21dignity as an interpretative tool for all of the provisions. Clearly, the latter aspect
was developed on the ground that detention conditions could easily debase or even
annihilate human dignity. 26 Another aspect worthy of note is that the SMR also
27
addressed and applied to juvenile detainees and prisoners. This feature of the
SMR is in common with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (the so-called "Beijing Rules"), which boosts
the application of several standards, values, and requirements set by the SMR, such
as proportionality of the sanction, and the requirements for rehabilitation and
resocialization inside prisons and similar institutions. 28 This feature is also in line
with the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, which was adopted in
1990 to facilitate the enforcement of the SMR values at a national level .29
The EPR were originally adopted in 1973 and were subsequently updated in
1987 and 2006.30 The EPR were drafted to address the specific needs of detainees
in Council of Europe Member States.31 More precisely, the rules were formulated
with the purpose of boosting the application of the globally acknowledged soft law
24. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, First United Nations Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doe. A/CONF/61 1, annex 1 (Aug. 30,
1955).
25. See id, -M 22-6, 60, 77-8.
26. See Phillippa Kaufmann, The price of dignity and liberty: legal aid for prisoners, 5 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REv., 482-493 (2013) (stressing that the status of persons deprived of their liberty makes
prisoners more vulnerable and exposes to easy threats their dignity, since they are under the control of
state's authority); Piet Hein van Kempen, Positive obligations to ensure the human rights of prisoners,
INTERNATIONAL PENAL AND PENITENTIARY FOUNDATION WEBSITE,
http://www.intemationalpenalandpenitentiaryfoundation.org/Site/documents/Stavern/05-Stavern-Contr
ibution%20Van%2OKempen.pdf (last visited July 18, 2015). For analysis of the IACtHR and the
ECtHR's views, see Juvenile Re-education Institute v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, 1 153-155 (Sept. 2, 2004) (also
known as Panchito Lopez v. Peru case); Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H. R. 197, 94 (2000);
Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H. R. 93, 95 (2002). The centrality of human dignity is also
stressed in the U.N. Draft Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Prisoners, see G.A. Res. 45/111, supra
note 23.
27. G.A. Res. 40/33, supra note 23. The SMR addresses and applies to juvenile detainees and
prisoners too, in line with the express reference made by Rule 27 of the "Beijing Rules" and pursuant to
the saving clause provided by Rule 9, which confirms the applicability of international standards
concerning juvenile justice issues, in particular the SMR. Id.
28. Id.
29. G.A. Res. 45/111, supra note 23.
30. Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee
of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, II January 2006, Rec(2006)2,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/43f313481 0.html,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghVstandardsetting/prisons/E%20commentary%2Oto%20the%2OEPR.pdf (last
visited Sept. 22, 2015).
31. See MURDOCH, supra note 21, at 15. (Council of Europe Publishing, 2006); DENIS ABELS,
PRISONERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 49 (Springer, 2012).
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32
rules on detention, in particular those of the SMR. The EPR are mirrored, in the
Inter-American system of human rights protection, by the Principles and Best
Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of their Liberty in the Americas. 
33
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR") adopted these
Principles in 2008 with the aim being to set specific and more effective rules
concerning detention conditions and issues related to torture and other inhuman or
degrading treatment within the framework of the Organization of the American
States ("OAS").34 The EPR and the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection
of Persons Deprived of their Liberty in the Americas have many points in
common. Firstly, they share the same goal: namely to increase the effectiveness of
the protection of detainees in their contexts of application. 35 Secondly, they were
both inspired by the SMR, which constitute their archetype.36 The Kampala
Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa ("the Kampala Declaration") 37 serves
the same purpose and restates that prisoners do not forfeit their rights. 38 This soft
law instrument on prison management was adopted by a pan-African conference in
199639 and, similar to the EPR and the Principles and Best Practices on the
Protection of Persons Deprived of their Liberty in the Americas, it is patterned on
the SMR (albeit its statements are more concise). Both the United Nations General
Assembly and the United Nations Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC"), in
Resolution 1997/36, recognized the Kampala Declaration's importance as a tool to
enforce the most fundamental rights of detainees.40
32. Id. at 34-7; from this standpoint, also the ECtHR's "regionalism" is relevant: see Lech
Garlicki, Conferencia introductoria: Universalism v. Regionalism?: the Role of the Supranational
Judicial Dialog, in EL DIALOGO ENTRE LOS SISTEMAs EUROPEO Y AMERICANO DE DERECHOS
HUMANos 27, 36 (Civitas,
2012).https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=pl&u=http://bibliografia.icm.edu.pt/g2/english.p
%3Fmod%3Ds%26p%3D2%26a%3D 1%26s%3D4577%26imie%3DLech%26nazwisko%3DGarlicki%
261im%3D25%26ord%3D1 &prev-search.
33. Principles and Best Practices, supra note 10.
34. University of Bristol OPCAT Research Team, The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights 'Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas
and the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture, (last visited Sept. 22, 2015),
http://www.bris.ac.uk/media-library/sites/aw/migrated/documents/iacmhrprinciples.pdf
35. European Prison Rules, supra note 9; Principles and Best Practices, supra note 10.
36. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 8.
37. Afr. Union, Ext/Assembly/AU/PA/Draft/Decl.(l) Rev. 1, Kampala Declaration on Refugees,
Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4af0623d2.html.
38. More precisely, the second Recommendation on Prison Conditions of the Kampala
Declaration refers to prisoners' human rights. See Amanda Dissel, Comments on the Kampala
Declaration, in PRISON CONDITIONS IN AFRICA 99-118 (1996),
http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php/publications/1360-comments-on-the-kampala-declaration.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2015).
39. The 4th Pan African Conference was convened in Kampala, Uganda, from 23 to 27
September 1996 with delegates from forty-six African National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
in attendance. ICRC Resource Centre, Kampala Declaration, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 318 (1997), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnpl.htm.
40. S.C. Res. 1997/36 at 2 (Jul. 21, 1997),
VOL. 44:1
2015 PRISONERS' RIGHTS & HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE COURTS 27
III. THE APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES AND
PRINCIPLES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS OF DETAINEES
The violation of human rights in detention is a serious concern for all human
rights supervisors. It is therefore not surprising that, similar to the ICCPR and
ACHR, the ECHR also contains a key provision, Article 3, which grants protection
to people under custody and detention, albeit indirectly.
41
Article 3 ECHR forbids inhuman or degrading treatment.42  It is a common
understanding that this Article does not allow limitations or derogations under any
conditions. 43 However, as Michael K. Addo and Nicholas Grief lucidly observed,
Article 3 "does not expressly provide that its terms are absolute." 44 Moreover,
settled case law of the ECtHR has established that Article 3 also "imposes [a
positive] obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons
deprived of their liberty."4 5  More specifically, in Orchowski v. Poland, the
Strasbourg judges maintained that the state must ensure that the accommodations
provided for detainees, especially sleeping accommodations, respect human
dignity, privacy (to the extent possible), and meet the requirements of hygiene and
health, with due regard being paid to climatic conditions, especially to cubic
content of air, floor space, lighting, heating, and ventilation.46
Furthermore, and even more significantly, in the same line of cases, the
ECtHR held that, pursuant to Article 3 of the ECHR:
the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are
compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and
http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1997/eres 1997-36.htm.
41. ECHR, supra note 15, at 6.
42. Id. at art. 3 (stating "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.").
43. See Nigel S. Rodley, The Prohibition of Torture: Absolute Means Absolute, 34 DENV. J.
INT'L. L. & POL'Y 145, 159 (2006); Gianluca Gentili, European Court of Human Rights: An Absolute
Ban on Deportation of Foreign Citizens to Countries Where Torture or Ill-treatment is a Genuine Risk,
8 . INT'L. J. CONST. L. 311, 314 (2010). The absolute nature of the prohibition foreseen by Art. 3 of the
ECHR was stated in many ECtHR's decisions. See, e.g. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H. R.
439 (1989), 1 88; Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H. R. 149, 1 95; Saadi v. Italy, 2008-11 Eur. Ct.
H. R. 145, IMj 120, 127.
44. See Michael K. Addo, Nicholas Grief, Does Article 3 of The European Convention on Human
Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 510 (1998).
45. Mouisel v. France, 2002-IX Eur. Ct. H. R. 191, 40; see also Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI Eur.
Ct. H. R. 197, 1I 94; Musial v. Poland, Appl. (No. 28300/06) Eur. Ct. H. R. 86 (2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90783 (last visited Sept. 22, 2015); Gulay
Cetin v. Turkey, App. no. 44084/10 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Mar. 5, 2013) 84,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-116946 (last visited Sept. 22, 2015)
(providing a peculiar reference to physical integrity and third parties' attitudes-in particular medical
negligence).
46. Orchowski v. Poland, Appl. no. 17885/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Oct. 22, 2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i--001-95314 (last visited Sept. 22, 2015), 119-
122.
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method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or
hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering
inherent in detention...47
A similar approach is found in the ECtHR's decision in the Mouisel case. 48 In
this case the Court of Strasbourg considered that
[a]lthough Article 3 of the Convention cannot be construed as laying
down a general obligation to release detainees on health grounds, it
nonetheless imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical
well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by
providing them with the requisite medical assistance.49
This approach was strengthened three years later in the MeGlinchey and
Others v. the United Kingdom case, where the ECtHR held that the United
Kingdom was responsible under Article 3 of the ECHR for the unlawful conduct of
its prison authorities who had failed to comply with their obligation to provide the
victim, a woman with a long history of heroin addiction, with the requisite medical
care. 50  More recently, in the case of Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, the
ECtHR clarified that: "[in order to establish whether an applicant received the
requisite medical assistance while in detention, it is crucial to determine whether
the State authorities provided him with the minimum scope of medical supervision
for the timely diagnosis and treatment of his illness.' In the same line of cases,
the ECtHR stated in the Slawomir Musial case that Article 3 of the ECHR cannot
be interpreted as imposing on states a duty to release prisoners if detention
conditions do not suit their health needs appropriately or to place them in civil
facilities, regardless of the fact that the disease affecting them is hard to treat.52
Article 3 of the ECHR was drafted primarily during the early 1950s.5
3
Having the longest case law concerning detentions and prisons, Article 3 has
significantly influenced the content of detention provisions in other more recent
international human rights conventions, such as Article 5 of the ACHR.1
4
Curiously enough, Article 3 of the ECHR does not contain a fully operative rule
that gives effect to or properly describes the conditions the ECHR's contracting
47. Kudla, supra note 45, 94; Kalashnikov, supra note 26, 95.
48. Mouisel, supra note 45.
49. Id. 40.
50. McGlinchey v. United Kingdom, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H. R. 183, 1167.
51. Salakhov v. Ukraine, Appl. no. 28005/08 127 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Mar. 14, 2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i--001 -117134 (last visited Sept. 22, 2015).
52. Musial, supra note 45.
53. See Thomas Buergenthal, Centennial Essay: The Evolving International Human Rights
System, 100 Am. J. Int'l. L. 783, 787, 792 (2006); Tania Groppi, Anna Maria Lecis Coceo-Ortu, Le
citazioni reciproche tra la Corte europea e la Corte interamericana dei diritti dell'uomo: dall'influenza
al dialogo?, 19 FEDERALISMI.IT 1, 8 (2013), http://www.academia.edu/4603003/ (last visited Sept. 22,
2015).
54. See Tania Groppi, Anna Maria Lecis Cocco-Ortu, supra note 41, at 7; Buergenthal, supra
note 22. OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 29 ff. (Cambridge, 2nd ed.
2014).
https://books.google.comi/books/about/IntemationalHuman Rights Law.html?id=Uv8OBAAAQBAJ.
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states must comply with.55 On the contrary, its wording gives rise to several
uncertainties on the meaning and operational character of numerous expressions
used therein. Clearly this also has consequences on the application of Article 3 in
the prison field. For instance, there are uncertainties in relation to the expressions
"torture," "degrading treatment," and "inhuman treatment," as has been repeatedly
pointed out by various commentators.56 Further uncertainties concern the question
of whether "[i]ll-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity in order to
trigger the provision's application." 57 Moreover, uncertainty is inherent in the
distinction between the three types of infringement recognized in Article 3.
As Article 3 of the ECHR is so ambiguous in these and several other respects,
the ECtHR would benefit from referring to the above-mentioned and far more
detailed international standards as the major (or even crucial) tools for its
interpretation. This is in addition to the understanding and application of this
Article provided by the case law of the Strasbourg Court. 58 A landmark example
of this case law is the ruling in the Giive9 case, where the ECtHR found for the
first time that the imprisonment of a minor in an adult prison amounted to
degrading and inhuman treatment. 59  Nevertheless, as the above-named
international instruments of soft law on detention contain various elucidations on
issues, such as the meaning of the term "treatment," the basic criteria for
interpreting the content of the right of those deprived of liberty to decent and
humane treatment, the threshold of severity indispensable to meet the definition of
torture, and the forms of ill-treatment which can be considered inhuman treatment,
can provide valuable guidance to the Strasbourg Court for the application of
Article 3 of the ECHR. Moreover, such guidelines, standards, and general
principles may also help the Court to assess the proportionality of a punitive
measure imposed upon a prisoner. Furthermore, guidelines, standards, and general
principles can help the Strasbourg Court to establish the procedural guarantees
afforded to prisoners. Additional useful guidance, mutatis mutandis, can be found
in the annual reports of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention established by
Resolution 1991/42 of the former Commission on Human Rights and in the reports
of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
60
55. ECHR, supra note 15.
56. See, e.g., Pietro Pustorino, 'Articolo 3', in Commentario Breve alla Convenzione Europea per
la Salvaguardia dei Diritti dell'Uomo e della LibertA fondamentali 63 (Sergio Bartole, Pasquale De
Sena, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky eds., CEDAM 2012).
57. Addo, supra note 44, at 511.
58. See Pustorino, supra note 56, at 63; Addo, supra note 44, at 510.
59. Gtiveg v. Turkey, 2009-1 Eur. Ct. H. R. 17,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng# {%22fulltext%22:[%22GC3%BCveC3%A7%20v.%20Turkey/22],
%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:
[%22001-90700%22] }.
60. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: A
compilation of national, regional and international laws, regulations and practices on the right to
challenge the lawfulness of detention before court, 27th Sess., June 30, 2014, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/47,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/53ff197d4.html; Human Rights Council , Report of the Working Group
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The next question is therefore whether the ECtHR in its case-law under
Article 3 has already referred to the European Prison Rules, the Principles and Best
Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of their Liberty in the Americas,
the United Nations' Draft Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Prisoners, or other
international standards and guidelines on the treatment of detainees as
interpretative aids to this provision. In other words, in light of these rules and
instruments, the question is now whether the ECtHR has ever scrutinized measures
taken by the state parties to the Convention in the field of prison management. To
answer this question it is necessary to investigate the most significant judicial
decisions by the ECtHR on prisoner rights.
In the case of G. v. France,6' which concerned the continued detention over a
four-year period of the applicant who suffered from a chronic schizophrenic-type
psychiatric disorder, the ECtHR confirmed the determination by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("ECommHR") that Article 3 of the ECHR must be
interpreted in the light of "its natural and customary" meaning. With the only
exception of a brief reference to the Council of Europe's Recommendation
Rec(2006)2, the Court however did not refer to sources of law outside the ECHR
framework, namely the European Prison Rules or SMR, to support its decision. 62
The ECtHR's contention was that this was unnecessary since ". . .treating the
applicant-in prison and in a psychiatric institution-and detaining him in prison
had clearly impeded the stabilisation of his condition, demonstrating that he was
unfit to be detained from the standpoint of Article 3."63 A similar pattern emerges
from the Slawomir Musial case, where the ECtHR referred to the EPR but only for
the purpose of stressing its existence. 64 This is why the reference to the "the most
important regional guidelines on detention," as the EPR were called in the
judgment, did not help the ECtHR in identifying the content and scope of the
protection granted to detainees under Article 3 of the ECHR.65 Furthermore, and
more recently, in the Velyo Velev case,66 the Court relied neither on the EPR nor on
the SMR when it illustrated its understanding of the detainees' right to education
under Article 2 of Protocol No. I of the ECHR.67 This is clear from the judgment,
on Arbitrary Detention, 27th Sess., June 30, 2014, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/48,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/53eb29a04.html; see also Juan Ernesto Mendez, (Special Rapporteur on
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/28/68 (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.refworld.org/docid/550824454.html.
61. G. v. France, 2012-11 Eur. Ct. H. R.,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#/{%22fulltext%22:[%22G.%20v.%2OFrance%22],%22documentcollection
id2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57968%22] }.
62. Id. at 15.
63. Id.
64. Musial, supra note 45.
65. Id. at 96.
66. Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014-V, Eur. Ct. H. R.,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.inteng#{%22fulltext/o22:[%22VELYO%20VELEV%22],%22documentcollectio
nid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001 -
144131%22]}.
67. See Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
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although the ECtHR formally acknowledged the existence of both the EPR and
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers No. R. (89) 12 on education in
68prison.
Nevertheless, in the Guvec v. Turkey case the Court felt it necessary to
mention the EPR and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC") as support for affirming the states' duty to separate children from adult
prisoners.69 In particular, the Court held that different standards on detention on
the basis of the age are justified in the context of Article 3 of the ECHR.7 ° It also
maintained that
... although Article 3 of the Convention cannot be construed as laying
down a general obligation to release detainees on health grounds, it
nonetheless imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical
well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by
providing them with the requisite medical assistance.
71
Moreover, the idea that the above-mentioned international standards on
detention are not indispensable tools for interpretation of Article 3 can be derived,
implicitly, from the case of Mathew v. the Netherlands, where the ECtHR states
that the principles applicable to the treatment of detainees are those developed in
its own case law on Article 3 of the ECHR.72 A similar line of reasoning is found
in the Slawomir Musial v. Poland case, which concerned the transfer of the
applicant, who had suffered from epilepsy since early childhood and had also been
diagnosed with schizophrenia and other serious mental disorders, to a specialized
institution.73 Confirming its interpretative approach in the Mathew case, the
ECtHR held that to determine whether the inadequate medical care and
inappropriate conditions in which the applicant was held during his detention
should be qualified as degrading and inhuman, each contracting state must
consider the general principles on prison management developed by the Strasbourg
Court. 74 In particular, each contracting state must look at the manner and method
used for execution of the measure as well as the duration of the treatmeni; its
physical and mental effects; and in some circumstances, the age, sex, and state of
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Mar. 20, 1952, C.E.T.S. No. 009,
http://conventions.coe.intTreaty/en/Freaties/Htmli/09.htm.
68. Velev, supra note 66, In 21-4.
69. Guive9, supra note 59, 11158, 83.
70. Id. M188,91.
71. Id. 96; see also lla~cu v. Moldova, 2004-ViI Eur. Ct. H. R. 100,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng# {%22fulltext%22:[[%2211aC5%9Fcu%20and%200thers%20v.%2Mold
ova%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22ite
mid%22:[%22001-61886%22]}; on the subject, see Clara Burbano Herrera, How does the European
system of human rights protect detainees in bad health?, 6 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTs. J. 157-172
(2013).
72. Mathew v. Netherlands, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 34, (ECtHR expressly recalled principles
developed in its case-law).
73. See Musial, supra note 45, 97.
74. Id. 85, 88.
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health of the detainee.75 Moreover, and more recently, a similar approach was also
endorsed in the Torreggiani line of cases, 76 where the ECtHR referred to the
standards developed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CPT") 77 as relevant criteria for
assessment of the contracting states' responsibility under Article 3 of the ECHR
and as yardsticks in the allocation of the burden of proof.
7 8
Why are the international standards on detention not routinely used as tools
for interpreting the most relevant ECHR Articles for the protection of detainees?
In other words, why are these standards not routinely incorporated in the ECtHR's
legal reasoning? This paper takes the view that these reasons are unclear and
difficult to identify. Especially, if one considers that, at least since the 1990s, the
ECtHR has acknowledged that public international law rules can be used as
supportive evidence in order to extend the applicability of the ECHR's
provisions.7 9 Furthermore, the doctrine of margin of appreciation,8 ° which is the
main reason for the quasi-systematic rejection of the international standards on the
protection of fundamental rights in states of emergency as tools for interpreting
Article 15 of the ECHR, 81 has never been invoked in respect of Article 3, which is
the key provision in relation to prison management and the treatment of
detainees. 8 2 Moreover, international soft law instruments, such as the SMR and
75. Mathew, supra note 72, 1 175.
76. Torreggiani v. Italy, App. Nos. 43517/09, 35315/10, 37818/10, 46882/09, 55400/09,
57875/09, 61535/09 Eur. Ct. H. R., 25 (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i--001-115860.; for a commentary, see Gabriele
Della Morte, La situazione carceraria italiana viola strutturalmente gli standard sui diritti umani (a
margine della sentenza Torreggiani c. Italia), 7 (1) DIR. UM. DIR. INT. 147-158 (2013).
77. Council of Europe, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, The CPT Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002) I-Rev 2010,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d7882092.html (last visited May 9, 2015).
78. For some interesting considerations on the ECtHR's jurisprudence on detention after the
Torreggiani case, see Francesca Cancellaro, Da Roma a Bruxelles: la Corte EDU applica i principi
della sentenza Torreggiani anche alle condizioni di detenzione in Belgio, DIRITTO PENALE
CONTEMPORANEO (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/tipologia/0-/-/-/3523-
da roma a bruxelles la corteedu applica iprincipi della sentenza torreggiani anchealle condi
zioni di detenzione in belgio/ (last visited May 9, 2015).
79. See Gustafsson v. Sweden, 1996-11 Eur. Ct. H. R. 2,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%/22fulltext/22:[%/22Gustafsson/20v. /2OSweden /22],/22document
collectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001 -
58213%22]1}.
80. See Joseph Jean-Louis Correa, Le voile islamique devant la Cour europenne des droits de
I'Homme : entre marge nationale d'apprciation et ndcessit d'un droit commun des droits
fondamentaux : les cas de la France et de la Suisse, 14 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 234, 237 (2006);
Frangoise Tulken, L 'usage de la marge d'apprdciation par la Cour europ4enne des droits de I 'homme,
Paraventjuridique superflu ou mdcanisme indispensable par nature?, I REV. SC. CRIM. 3,14 (2006).
81. See Francesco Seatzu, The Experiences of the European and Inter-American Courts of
Human Rights with the International Standards on the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Times of
Emergency, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF TULLIO TREVES 573-585 (Nerina Boschiero, Tullio Scovazzi, Cesare Pitea and Chiara
Ragni eds., T.M.C. Asser, 2013).
82. Steven Greer, The Margin ofAppreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European
VOL. 44:1
2015 PRISONERS' RIGHTS & HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE COURTS 33
EPR, can indeed help both supranational and national courts to ensure the respect
of human rights and fundamental freedoms for prisoners. 83 Last, an increasing
number of ECtHR's rulings attach importance to the EPR and other
recommendations of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers dealing with
specific aspects of penitentiary policy, despite their non-binding character. 84 One
example of this approach is the GilveV case, where the Strasbourg Court referred to
international binding and non-binding instruments relevant to the field of prison
management and used them in its legal reasoning.85 Likewise, in the Al Nashiri
case the ECtHR found that Poland failed to comply with its international duties by
allowing the torture, secret detention, and extraordinary rendition of a Saudi
Arabian national and a stateless Palestinian, both allegedly guilty of terrorist acts. 86
Finally, the ECtHR's position is strikingly different from the IACtHR's case law
on detention and fundamental prisoner rights. This said, it might nevertheless be
useful to briefly speculate on some possible explanations for the ECtHR's conduct.
A first possible explanation for the non-generalized use of the above-
mentioned soft law standards in the ECtHR's case law on prison management and
detainee rights is that these standards were drafted to facilitate the application of
detention provisions in other international human rights instruments such as the
ICCPR and the CAT.87 Another possible explanation is the difficulty of selecting,
from among the various international standards currently existing on the treatment
of detainees, those most appropriate for the interpretation of the relevant ECHR
Articles for the protection of this category of vulnerable individuals. Mainly, this
is because of the diversity of the content of the existing soft law instruments on
detention. Finally, the non-generalized use of the standards by the Strasbourg
Judges might be influenced, albeit indirectly, by the fact that the ECtHR has
traditionally resisted extending its constructive interpretation method to the use of
non-legally binding international instruments, and often avoids incorporating them
into its purposive interpretation technique.
88
Convention of Human Rights, 17 HUM. RTs. FILES 1, 7-13 (Jul. 2000),
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES- 7%282000%29.pdf.
83. See G. v. France, supra note 61; Musial. supra note 45; Neptune v. Haiti, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 180, 131 (May 6, 2008); Loor v. Panama,
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (set. C) No. 218,
215 (Nov. 23, 2010); Vera v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 226, 50 (May 19,2011).
84. See Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2006) 2 on the
European Prison Rules (2006), http://www.refworld.org/docid/43tf3134810.html.
85. Giiveq, supra note 59, 58-9, 60-4, 83.
86. Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 Eur. Ct. H. R. (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -146044.
87. U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Jun. 26, 1987); see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N Doc. A/6316, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966).
88. See e.g., Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, Eur. Ct. H. R.(2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -68381; see also Cesare Pitea, Interpretation
and Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Broader Context of international
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However, these reasons do not justify the non-use of these and other
correspondent non-binding instruments to assist interpretation of Article 3 of the
ECHR and of the other ECHR provisions relevant to the treatment of detainees.
On the contrary, the strong analogies between Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 5
of the ACHR,89 and above all the need for a "jurisprudence constante" on
prisoners' rights and prison management, show that such instruments may indeed
be regularly used as tools for the interpretation, at least of Article 3 of the ECHR.
In other words, the EPR and SMR are very helpful in clarifying the meaning and
operational character of detention provisions in human rights treaties. Therefore,
the ECtHR's approach to Article 3, as well as with Articles 2, 6, and 8 of the
ECHR and to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, when they are applied to
prisoners' cases should be based on a systematic use of the non-binding
international standards on prison management. For example, the EPR, the
Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of their
Liberty in the Americas, the SMR, and the United Nations Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention's Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedies and
Procedures on the Right of Anyone Deprived of His or Her Liberty by Arrest or
Detention to Bring Proceedings Before Court ("Basic Principles and Guidelines")
may be useful to this end.90 Furthermore, by complying with such rules-notably
with the EPR and SMR, which aim to lay down universal standards having binding
force outside any treaty process and hence applicable irrespective of their specific
acceptance by states, and available to any fundamental rights supervisory
mechanism 91 -the ECtHR may clarify the meaning and operational character of
various expressions used in Article 3 of the ECHR.
To summarize, perusal of the ECtHR' s case law on prisoner rights reveals
that the negative approach of the ECtHR towards the standards and principles has
significant consequences, whose impact has not been yet universally recognised.
92
A notable, though implicit, recognition has been made by Clare Ovey, who rightly
observed that the main focus of the case law of the ECtHR on prisoners has been:
Law: Myth or Reality?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 21 r CENTURY 1-14 (Yves
Haeck, Eva Brems eds., Springer, 2014); Jean-Frangois Flauss and Gerard Cohen-Jonathan, Cour
europdenne des droits de 1'"Homme et droit international general, 51 A.F.D.I. 675-677 (2005).
89. ECHR, supra note 15, at art. 3; ACHR, supra note 16, at art. 5.
90. European Prison Rules, supra note 30; Principles and Best Practices, supra note 33; Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 24; Human Rights Council Res. 20/16,
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., A/HRC/RES/20/16 (July 17, 2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/lssues/Detention/Pages/DraftBasicPrinciples.aspx%20.
91. PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL, A Compendium of Comparative Prison Legislation 6
(2008), http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/man-2008-compendium-prison-
legislation-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
92. This point emerges a contrario from some recent works on the ECtHR's jurisprudence on
detainees' rights. See e.g., Daniela Ranalli, Nuovi interventi della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo in
tema di trattamento carcerario 2 RASS. PEN. CRIM. (2013) 157-172; Fabiana Fucci, La tutela del diritto
alla corrispondenza dei detenuti nella giurisprudenza della Cone europea dei diritti dell 'uomo, 16 1
DIRITTI DELL'UOMO, CRONACHE E BATrAGLIE (2005) 37-44; Andreana Esposito, Condizioni della
detenzione e trattamento dei detenuti: la cultura della detenzione, 1-2 DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA: L'ITALIA
E LA CONVENZIONE EUROPEA DEI DIRITI DELL'UOMO (2000) 99-116.
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"to ensure that prisoners are not placed in health-threateningly bad conditions,
enjoy access to medical care and are protected from other forms of serious ill-
treatment," which is the same focus as the EPR and SMR.93 This position has also
been indirectly endorsed by Professor Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, who recalls the
main solution of the Strasbourg Judges to guarantee protection of detainees under
Article 3 of the ECHR, namely the 'creation' of an Article 3a.
94
IV. THE APPROACH OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES
AND PRINCIPLES ON THE PROTECTION OF DETAINEES'
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The ACHR expressly indicates that there may be situations in which the
deprivation of liberty may be justified. Deprivation of liberty issues are addressed
in Article 5 of the ACHR. 95 Article 5 provides that:
1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral
integrity respected.
2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person.
3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the
criminal.
4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be
segregated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate
treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons.
5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from
adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible,
so that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors.
6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an
essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners.
96
Article 5 is of paramount importance for the system of protection of human
rights under the ACHR's aim to establish precise restrictions on the states' actions
and allow the international community to identify violations of the right to humane
93. See Clare Ovey, Ensuring respect of the rights of prisoners under the European Convention
on Human Rights as part of their reintegration process, REGISTRY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (last visited May 10, 2015),
http://www.coe.int/t/DGHJSTANDARDSETTING/PRISONS/Conference 19_files/COURT-
%20CIare%200vey/o20Helsinki.pdf.
94. See Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Les equivalents de P article 3 de la Convention europenne
dans le systhme interamricain des droits de l'homme, in LA PORT.E DE ['ARTICLE 3 DE LA
CONVENTION EUROPtENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 2346 (Catherine Amdlie Chassin ed., Bruylant,
2006).
95. ACHR supra note 16, at art. 5.
96. Id.
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treatment. 97 Article 5's terms regulate the measures used in the Inter-American
States in some of the most critical human rights situations-the imprisonment and
punishment of people, including minors.98
The Inter-American States Parties must ensure that their rules on detention
and punishment are fully in line with all the requirements of the ACHR. 99 While
not questioning the right of Inter-American States Parties to restrict and limit the
personal liberty of individuals for the legitimate purposes of punishment or
investigation, the IACtHR always requires them to withdraw the restrictions on
personal liberty as soon as possible.100 In other words, when restricting or limiting
the right to personal liberty under Article 5 of the ACHR, the ultimate aim of a
Inter-American State shall be to return to normality as soon as possible. In both
theory and practice, the detention of individuals is by definition a temporary
measure. Indeed, the temporary nature of detention and of restriction on personal
liberty constitutes an essential safeguard for any individual, including and
especially accused persons.
As noted, the ACHR had to acknowledge that the limitations and restrictions
on personal liberty may be necessary in exceptional circumstances.101 Instead of
approaching the matter exclusively from a prohibition perspective, as the ECHR
does, the ACHR wisely sets out the formal requirements and prerequisites under
which such limitations and restrictions of personal liberty are allowed. 10 2  In
addition, Article 5 of the ACHR also establishes the aim, degree, and scope of
punishment. 10 3  Professor Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen observes that this feature
distinguishes Article 5 of the ACHR from corresponding provisions in other
human rights conventions such as the ECHR.104 While both conventions aim to
establish many of the same guarantees, and both forbid degrading treatment within
the framework of the ban on torture, the array of content-related elements is more
comprehensive in the ACHR than in the ECHR. However, like the ECHR, the
97. WILLIAM SCHABAs, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD'S COURTS 40-1 (Ne. Univ. Press) (1996).
98. ACHR, supra note 16, at art.5 In 3-6 (focusing on the rehabilitative aim-reform and social
readaptation of the prisoners-of the deprivation of liberty).
99. Id. at art. 1(1). Under Article 1, titled "Obligation to Respect Rights," provides that:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized
herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of
those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth,
or any other social condition.
id. See also Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 186, 1 179,203 (Aug. 12,2008).
100. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 170, 11 53 (Nov. 21, 2007); Argiielles v. Argentina,
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 288,
11120 (Nov. 20, 2014).
101. Argiielles, supranote 100, 128.
102. ACHR, supra note 16, at art. 5 6, art. 7 I[ 2-3.
103. ACHR, supra note 16, at art. 5.
104. See Burgorgue-Larsen, supra note 94, at 23.
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ACHR fails to provide expressly that the prohibition from torture and degrading
treatments admits no exception under any circumstances.' 05
Comparison with the ECtHR shows that for the purpose of interpreting
Article 5 of the ACHR, the IACtHR has occasionally referred to international
instruments of soft law on the detention and treatment of detainees, such as the
SMR and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form
of Detention or Prison ("the Body of Principles"). 106 This approach was justified
by the IACtHR on the premise that these international non-binding tools can help
to ascertain the precise content and scope of the Inter-American States' obligations
regarding the protection of detainees. 10 7 In this respect, it is worth recalling the
Ver Vera ruling, where the Inter-American Court referred to Principle 24 of the
Body of Principles to identify a breach of Article 5 of the ACHR.'0 5 Further
confirmation of the Court's recourse to different external sources to interpret the
rights enshrined in the ACHR is found in the landmark case Panchito Lopez
concerning Paraguay where the 1ACtHR developed tailored protection of juvenile
prisoners' right to education by combining Articles 4 and 5 of the ACHR with
Article 13 of the Protocol of San Salvador and the CRC. 109 Again, a similar line of
reasoning is found in the case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala,"l where the
IACtHR used the relevant practice of the courts of other Inter-American States and
of other human-rights monitoring bodies to conclude that:
An international juridical regime of absolute prohibition of all forms of
torture, both physical and psychological, has been developed and, with
regard to the latter, it has been recognized that the threat or real danger
of subjecting a person to physical harm produces, under determined
circumstances, such a degree of moral anguish that it may be considered
"psychological torture."" 1
In the leading case of Bayarri v. Argentina, to show that the duty of judicial
authorities to guarantee the rights of the person detained entails the obligation to
obtain and ensure the authenticity of any evidence that can demonstrate acts of
torture, the IACtHR referred to sources of law outside the Inter-American system,
namely the Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("the Manual or
Istanbul Protocol").'12 Moreover, in the case of Valle Jaramillo and others v.
105. See ACHR, supra note 16.
106. Neptune, supra note 83, 131; Loor, supra note 83, 215; Vera, supra note 83, 50; Fleury
v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 236, 85 (Nov. 23, 2011).
107. De la Cruz-Flores v. Perii. Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser.
C) No. 115, 132 (Nov. 18, 2004); Vera, supra note 83, 69.
108. Vera, supra note 83, 69.
109. Juvenile Re-education Institute, supra note 26.
110. Urrutia v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C)
No. 103 (Nov. 27, 2003).
111. ld. 92.
112. Bayarri v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 187, 92 (Oct. 30, 2008).
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Colombia, the IACtHR also referred to external sources of law to hold the
existence of a duty under Article 5 of the ACHR to take all reasonable measures
necessary to guarantee the right to personal liberty and personal integrity of the
human rights defenders who denounce human rights breaches and who are in a
situation of special vulnerability.1 3 Furthermore, in Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, the
Inter-American Court held that, "detention in conditions of overcrowding, with
lack of ventilation and natural light, without a bed to rest on or adequate conditions
of hygiene, in isolation or with undue restrictions to the visiting regime, constitutes
a violation of personal integrity" by referring, inter alia, to the Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 114
Nevertheless, an even cursory review of the case law of the IACtHR on
Article 5 shows there are some exceptions to this approach. For instance, one
exception to the use of sources of law outside the Inter-American system for
supporting a purposive interpretation of Article 5 of the ACHR is found in the
leading case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama relating to the forced disappearance
of Heliodoro Portugal, a "well-known member of the Panamanian Communist
Party," from Panama City in 1970.115 Nearly thirty years after his forced
disappearance from Panama, the Panamanian Attorney General's Office
discovered human remains in a barracks in Tocumen, which, after undergoing
DNA testing, were identified as being those of the victim." 6 For this reason, the
IACtHR rightly alleged violation of Article 5(2) of the ACHR relating to personal
integrity and human dignity. 117 More precisely and significantly, it held that the
violation of certain rights of the primary victim, in cases of enforced
disappearances, killings, or extra-judicial killings, for instance, might also lead to a
breach of the right to integrity of 'secondary victims' (friends or relatives). 18 The
United Nations General Assembly adopted a consensus resolution on principles to
protect all persons from enforced disappearance, the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance," 9 and extensive studies on this topic
have been conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC")120
and Amnesty International;' 2' notwithstanding that, the IACtHR did not refer to
113. Jaramillo v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C)
No. 192, 89 (Nov. 27, 2008).
114. Neptune, supra note 83, 131.
115. See Portugal, supra note 99.
116. Portugal, supra note 99, 2.
117. Id. il 3, 162-63, 174, 181.
118. Id. 175; see also Jaramillo, supra note 13, 119.
119. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res 47/133
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 92nd Plen Mtg, U.N. Doc A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992).
120. Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations Human
Rights Council conceming the draft, International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from
Enforced Disappearances (Jun. 27, 2006),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/human-rights-council-statement-270606.htm
(last accessed May 6, 2015).
121. Amnesty Int'l, Disappearances: A Workbook (1981).
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these documents as aids to the interpretation of Article 5.12' As a consequence, the
IACtHR failed to avoid the "pitfalls of regulating the legal status of disappeared
persons through a declaration of death," as remarked by Gabriella Citrioni.
123
Another exception is found in the case of Cantoral Huamani and Garcia Santa
Cruz v. Peru, which concerned the alleged kidnapping, torture, and extrajudicial
execution of Sattl Isaac Cantoral-Huamani and Consuelo Trinidad Garcia-Santa
Cruz on February 13, 1989 in Lima, and the complete impunity of the perpetrators
of these facts. 124 In this case the IACtHR found that the right to mental and moral
integrity of the victims' next of kin had been infringed as a result of the particular
circumstances of the violations perpetrated against their loved ones, again without
referring to external sources of law-the SMR, EPR or the ECHR-to support its
interpretation, but referring solely to its previous decisions on the subject. 25
V. CONCLUSION
Will there ever be a change in the ECtHR's approach inspired by IACtHR
case law?
The answer should be yes, at least prima facie. Indeed, this change is
reasonably expected if one takes into account the strong similarities between
Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 5 of the ACHR in general and, in particular, the
substantial coincidence of their aims and regulatory principles. A further
indication of this change is the increasing number of references to the IACHR in
the ECtHR's case law. 1 6 However, there are equally strong arguments supporting
the opposite conclusion. Most of these arguments have already been discussed
above, but this paper will now consider them here according to their practical
significance.
The first argument is that unlike Article 3 of the ECHR, Article 5 of the
ACHR addresses the protection of the fight to personal, mental, and moral
integrity, not just from a prohibition perspective. 127 Clearly, the different approach
of Article 5 may also lead to different results as to the requirements and
prerequisites justifying limitations and restrictions of personal liberty.
The second argument is that Article 5 of the ACHR has two significant
features that distinguish it from Article 3 of the ECHR. Although both Articles
122. See Portugal, supra note 99.
123. See Gabriella Citroni, The Pitfalls of Regulating the Legal Status of Disappeared Persons
Through Declaration of Death, 12 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 787-803 (2014); see also Juan E. Mendez &
Josd Miguel Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a Litigation
Experience, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 507 (1990).
124. Cantoral-Huamani v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 167 (July 10, 2007).
125. Id 111-121.
126. Eur. Ct. H.R., References to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights, Research Report,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Researchreport-inter-american-courtENG.pdf (last accessed
May 9, 2015).
127. See ACHR, supra note 16, at art. 5 111.
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forbid torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment under any
circumstances, 12 8 only Article 5 of the ACHR deals with the legitimate degree of
punishment allowed for violations of the right to personal liberty. 129 In addition,
only Article 5 of the ACHR provides that: "[m]inors while subject to criminal
proceedings shall be separated from adults and brought before specialized
tribunals, as speedily as possible."
13 0
The third argument is that the ECtHR has all too frequently refused to extend
its constructive-interpretative approach to the use of international non-binding
rules on detention and prison management, and expressly failed to integrate these
non-binding instruments into its tools of purposive interpretation.'
1 31
The fourth argument is that the IACtHR's case law on detainees' rights and
prison management also includes certain rulings, such as in the ground-breaking
cases Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama and Huamani and Garcia Santa Cruz which
significantly omit to refer to non-binding 'soft law' instruments concerning the
protection of the fundamental rights of detainees as tools for interpreting Article 5
of the ACHR.'32
The fifth argument is that the IACtHR's case law on detainees' rights has
grown and developed in a socio-economic environment characterized by strong
peculiarities, namely the high level of inmate violence inside Latin American
prisons. 133
The sixth and final argument is that the ECtHR, unlike the IACtHR, has never
demanded improvements in general prison conditions.' 
34
For all of these reasons this paper does not expect the ECtHR to align itself
with the IACtHR's case law on detainee rights. In other words, it seems unlikely
that in the near future the ECtHR will assume a more positive attitude with respect
to the role of international soft law rules on detention-such as the EPR, the SMR,
or the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of their
Liberty in the Americas-as possible guides to the interpretation of Article 3 of the
ECHR.
128. ACHR, supra note 16, 1 2; see also ECHR, supra note 15, at art. 3.
129. See e.g., ACHR, supra note 16, at art. 5 4.
130. ACHR, supra note 16, 15.
131. See ACHR, supra note 16,13.
132. Portugal, supra note 99; Cantoral-Huamani, supra note 124.
133. CECILIE DINESEN ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN POST-CONFLICT GUATEMALA, 34
REV. PANAM. SALUD PUBLICA 162 (2013),
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script-sci arttext&pid=SI 020-49892013000900003.
134. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Herrera, supra note 71, at 165.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Any fragmentation of jurisdiction has a deleterious effect on international
criminal law as it may create jurisdictional confusion, conflicts of laws, forum
shopping, and can ultimately lead to impunity for perpetrators. Recently, this
confusion was further aggravated when the South American Government refused
to extradite Omar Al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court ("ICC") upon
issuance of a South African Court Order and a warrant issued by the ICC in order
to preserve the relationship with the African Union ("AU").'
This paper discusses the fragmentation of jurisdiction of international
criminal law, and discusses the basic jurisdictional mechanism of the ICC and
African Court of Justice and Human Rights ("ACJHR").
In January 2013, a proposal ("ACJHR Draft Protocol") was submitted to
expand the jurisdiction of the ACJHR. Though the Draft Protocol has failed to
meet with widespread support of African States, it serves to pose a risk of
defunctionality of the ICC, as it adds confusion as to which entity-the ACJHR or
the ICC-is empowered to adjudicate international crimes. The ICC was intended
to be the final adjudicator for individual responsibility for international crimes in
the new era.2 Yet, this mandate will be diluted if the ACJHR's jurisdiction is
expanded to include international crimes.
The regional court system has always been chaotic in Africa. 3 Recently, the
ACJHR was established by the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights ("Protocol on the ACJHR"), 4 which was a merger of the
* Jacky Fung Wai Nam received his LL.B. education at the City University of Hong Kong and
graduated in 2014 with first class honors. He also won the 2012 International Criminal Court
Competition in The Hague. He finished his Postgraduate Certificate in Laws and currently is a trainee
solicitor at an international leading law firm. He wishes to thank Dr. Kielsgard for his comments and
endless efforts and his friend Bettina Wang for proofreading this paper. He also wants to thank his
family, in particular to his mother and father, for their love and support - no matter how dark the sky is,
he can always see the brightest stars when they are around.
1. Mehari Taddele Maru, Why South Africa Let Bashir Get Away, AL JAZEERA (15 Jun. 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/south-africa-bashir-I 50615102211840.html.
2. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON TIE
ROME STATUTE, 53, 425,440 (1 st ed. 2010).
3. See generally Marc Schulman, The African Court Of Justice And Human Rights: A Beacon Of
Hope Or A Dead,-End Odyssey?, 2 INKUNDLA (2013),
http://www.inkundlajoumal.org/sites/default/files/2013_lnkundla 2_0.pdf.
4. See Aft. Union, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
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African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACHPR") 5 and the Court of Justice
of the African Union ("ACJ") 6. The ACHPR and the ACJ were replaced by the
ACJHR and the Protocol on the ACJHR became the single primary legal
instrument for the ACJHR.7
While the legality and the reputation of ACJHR are still being questioned by
commentators, 8 the African Union, in its January 2013 Summit of Assembly of
African Union Heads of State ("the AU Assembly"), considered expanding the
jurisdiction if the ACJHR to include criminal competence in the Draft Protocol on
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights ("the Draft Protocol"). 9 The international crimes under the
expanded jurisdiction include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, the
crime of unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism,
corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs,
trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources, and crimes
of aggression.' 0
The expansion of jurisdiction is under consideration. At its 2013 January
Summit, the AU Assembly asked the African Union Commission to consider
jurisdictional legitimacy and financial implications for the expanded power of the
ACJHR." Specifically, the African Union Commission was requested to
conduct a more thorough reflection... on the issue of popular
uprising... and on the appropriate mechanism capable of deciding the
legitimacy of such an uprising; . . . [and] to submit, a report on the
structural and financial implications.., from the expansion of the
jurisdiction of the African Court.. . to try international crimes .... 12
While it is impossible to predict whether the expansion of jurisdiction will
materialize, it is nonetheless beneficial to consider the potential relationship
between the ICC and the ACJHR if it is empowered with expanded criminal
jurisdiction. This is particularly relevant as most of the current ICC situations are
art.2, (July 1, 2008) [hereinafter Protocol on ACJHR],
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PROTOCOL STATUTE AFRICAN COURT JUSTICE-AND
-HUMAN RIGHTS.pdf (Protocol on ACJHR will be entered into force only after 30 days with 15
member states of the African Union ratifying it).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Ademola Abass, Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and
Challenges, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 933, 934-35 (2013); see also, Schulman, supra note 3.
9. Afr. Union EX.CL/Dec.766 (XXII), 1, Decision on the Draft Protocol on Amendments to
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Jan. 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Decision on Draft Protocol].
10. Afr. Union Specialized Technical Comm. on Just. and Legal Aff., Draft Protocol on
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7, annex art. 28(a) (May 15, 2012) [hereinafter Draft Protocol on Amendments].
11. Decision on Draft Protocol, supra note 9.
12. Id. 2-3.
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in Africa. 13 This discussion will examine the jurisdictional basis of these two
important international courts.
This paper will first give an overview of the historical background of the
African regional court system. It will discuss the basic jurisdictional mechanism
of the ICC and the current ACJHR, as well as the proposed mechanism of the
latter. It will further discuss the conflict of laws between the Draft Protocol on the
ACJHR and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome
Statute") 14 and the possible consequences. Finally, it will provide possible
solutions calculated to resolve the dispute.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFRICAN REGIONAL COURT SYSTEM
In order to fully understand the current situation in Africa, it is necessary to
first understand the background of the African regional court system. For several
decades, the states in Africa have ratified different human rights treaties and
conventions.
The African Union is the successor of the Organization of the African Unity
("OAU"). The OAU was established on May 25, 1963 and was adopted by thirty-
two African States 15 with the following objectives:
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
(b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
(c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and
independence;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
(e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.' 6
Towards these ends, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
("African Charter") was adopted by the OAU and entered into force in 1986 with
ratifications from all fifty-three African member states.' 7 The African Charter
established the first complaint mechanism with the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights, which required State Parties to provide self-reports on their
13. INT'L CRIM. CT., All Situations, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations%20ando20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx (last visited
Sept. 20, 2015).
14. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
15. DEP'T OF INT'L REL. AND COOPERATION FOR THE REP. OF S. AFR., Organization of African
Unity (OAU) / African Union (AU), http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/MultilateraVafrica/oau.htm (last
visited Sept. 20, 2015).
16. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, art. 2, 111, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39; see
also id at pmble.
17. AFR. COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, Ratification Table: African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/ (last visited Oct. 4,
2015).
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human rights status every two years. 18
In June 1998, the OAU adopted the Protocol on the ACHPR, which entered
into force in 2004, and established the first regional court in Africa, the African
Court of Human and Peoples' Rights.19 The role of the ACHPR is "to complement
and reinforce the functions of the [African] Commission in promoting and
protecting human and peoples' rights, freedoms and duties in African Union
Member States. The [African] Commission, being a quasi-judicial body, can only
make recommendations while the Court makes binding decisions."
20
In 1999, the Heads of State Assembly of the OAU issued the Sirte
Declaration, calling for the establishment of the AU.21 In 2000, The Lome Summit
adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union ("Constitutive Act"), which
specified the objectives, principles, and organs of the AU.22 Thereafter, the AU
was established in 2001 .23 The AU then adopted the Protocol on the African Court
of Justice ("ACJ") and it entered into force in 2009.24 The ACJ is the principal
judicial organ of the Union 25 with functions similar to that of the International
Court of Justice: to interpret the Constitutive Act, deal with questions relating to
international law, and to deal with disputes arising out of a breach of the
obligations of the treaties between State Parties to the AU.26
However, before the ACJ was established, the AU passed a motion in 2004 to
merge the ACHPR with the ACJ.27 The Protocol on the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights ("ACJHR") was adopted on July 1, 2008 and would only enter
into force thirty days after its ratification by fifteen member states. 28 As of
February 3, 2014, out of fifty-three member states of the AU, thirty have signed
18. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 62, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5
(Jun. 27, 1981).
19. AFR. CT. OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, Frequently Asked Question, http://www.afican-
court.org/en/index.php/vacancies-3/frequent-questions#court-establishment (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
20. Id.
21. Org. of Afr. Unity EAHG/Drafl/Decl. (IV) Rev. 1, 8(i), Sirte Declaration (Sept. 9, 1999)
[hereinafter Sirte Declaration].
22. See generally Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2001, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3.
[hereinafter Constitutive Act of the AU].
23. Id. See also U.N. ECON. COMMISSION FOR AFR., History & Background of Africa 's Regional
Integration Efforts, U.N., http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/history-background-africas-regional-
integration-efforts (last visited Dec. 8, 2015).
24. Afr. Union, Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union (Jul. 1, 2003) [hereinafter
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union]; AFR. UNION, List of Countries Which Have
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union,
http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%2on%2Statute%2of /2Othe%2OAfrican%2OCourt%20of
%20Justice%20and%20HR.pdf [hereinafter List of Countries].
25. Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, supra note 24 at art. 2, 2.
26. Id. at art. 19.
27. Aft. Union Assembly/AU/Dec.83(V), Decision on the Merger of the African Court on Human
and Peoples'Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union-Assembly/A U/6(V) (July 4-5, 2005);
Afr. Union Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (111) Rev.l, 4, Decision on the Seats of the African Union (July 6,
2004).
28. Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4, at ch. II art. 9.
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the Protocol on the ACJHR but only five have ratified it.29 The five states are
Benin,30 Burkina Faso, 31 Congo 32 Libya,
33and Mali.34
Although only five states ratified the Protocol on the ACJHR, the importance
of the draft protocol extending court's jurisdiction is significant because out of
those five states, two are currently being prosecuted by the ICC (Libya and
Congo) 35 and one is currently being investigated (Mali)36 Moreover, the AU also
passed a motion to call on state parties to ratify the Protocol on ACJHR.37 Given
that thirty state parties have signed the protocol but not yet ratified, 31 it may
become part of the legal landscape in Africa in near future.
If the Protocol on ACJHR comes into force, it could result in a new way of
thinking about the relationship between international courts. Therefore, a
comparison of the jurisdictional triggering mechanism of the ICC and the proposed
mechanism under the Protocol of the ACJHR, with a particular emphasis on
jurisdictional superiority, will be fruitful.
III. JURISDICTION OF THE ICC AND THE DRAFT PROTOCOL OF THE ACJHR
There are four crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute:
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. 39
Moreover, there are three triggering mechanism in the ICC. Article 13 of Rome
Statute states that:
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
(a) A situation... is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in
accordance with article 14;
(b) A situation... is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
Council; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such
a crime in accordance with article 15.
Thus, the ICC may assume jurisdiction through state-referral, Security
Council referral, or the Prosecutor's exercise of his proprio motu powers.
29. List of Countries, supra note 24.
30. Id. (ratified June 28, 2012).
31. Id. (ratified June 23, 2010).
32. Id. (ratified Dec. 14, 2011).
33. Id. (ratified May 6, 2009).
34. Id. (ratified Aug. 13, 2009).
35. INT'L. CRIM. CT., supra note 13.
36. Id.
37. INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE, African Court No Substitute for ICC,
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/african-court-no-substitute-icc.
38. List of Countries, supra note 24.
39. Rome Statute, supra note 14; see also Int'l. Crim. Ct. Res. RC/Res. 6, at art. 15 bis 3 (Jun.
11, 2010) (The ICC will only exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression after 1 January 2017 if the
same majority of the Rome Statutes have adopted this amendment will be entered).
40. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 13.
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Currently, the ICC has eight situations of which four are self-referrals (Mali,41
Uganda,42 Democratic Republic of Congo,43 and Central African Republic44). The
ICC may also exercise jurisdiction when the crime is committed on the territory of
a state party,45 or when the crime is committed by a national of a State Party on the
territory of a non-State Party.46 In case of a non-state party, the country can
voluntarily accept the jurisdiction of the ICC by declaration under Article 12(3) of
the Rome Statute. 47 The United Nations Security Council may also refer non-state
parties to the ICC
48
After referral to the ICC, the court will determine whether it satisfies the
conditions laid down under the complementarity regime (Article 17 of the Rome
Statute).49 Thus, the case will be inadmissible if the case "has been investigated"50
or "is being investigation" 51 or the person previously "has been tried ' 52 for the
same crime. 5 Additionally, the case will be inadmissible if the state party
concerned is willing54 and able55 to prosecute such case. Finally, the case will be
inadmissible if the offense is of insufficient gravity. 56 The ICC will only prosecute
when both the jurisdictional and the admissibility tests have been satisfied.
Article 98 of the Rome Statute also obliges the court not to proceed with a
request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested state to act
inconsistently with their obligations under international agreements 57 or
international law.5 8 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter also gives power to the Security
41. Situation in the Republic of Mali, ICC-01//12-1, Decision Assigning the Situation in the
Republic of Mali to Pre-Trial Chamber 1I (Jul. 19, 2012).
42. Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July
2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005 (Sept. 27, 2005).
43. Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-02/04-1,Decision Assigning the Situation in
the Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber 1 (Jul. 5, 2004).
44. Situation in Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01, Decision Assigning the Situation in the
Central African Republic to Pre-Trial Chamber III (Jan. 19. 2005).
45. Rome Statute supra note 14, at 99 (This basis also provides jurisdiction to the ICC when the
crime is committed on board a vessel or aircraft where the place of registration is a State Party to the
Rome Statute).
46. Id.; see also Andreas Th. MUller & Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on Trial: From Panacea
to Patient, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1273 (2010).
47. Rome Statute supra note 14, at art. 12.
48. Id. at art. 13(b).
49. Id.
50. Id. at art. 17(1)(b).
51. Id. at art. 17(l)(a).
52. Id. at art. 17(1)(c).
53. See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Application by the
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the
Statute, 52 (May 30, 2011).
54. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17, 2.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at art. 96.
58. Id.
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Council to refer situations to the ICC, which overrides other treaty obligations. 59
Article 98 of the Rome Statute will pose problems if the Draft Protocol enters into
force by further confusing the jurisdictional priority of these two courts. 60
By contrast, the Draft Protocol and Protocol on ACJHR are more aggressive
than the Rome Statute. Article 28 of the Protocol on ACJHR defines the
jurisdiction of the ACJHR where it can exercise competence over legal disputes
relating to the interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act of the AU,
other AU Treaties, any legal instruments adopted by the OAU, and all human
rights instruments which the AU has adopted (including the African Charter, the
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa). 6' The ACJHR
can also exercise its jurisdiction relating to the interpretation of international law,
any decisions or acts handed down by the organs of the AU, any matters arising
out of agreements between the State Parties, any breach of obligation owed to a
State Party or the AU, and the extent of reparations of the breach of international
obligation.62 Arguably, Article 28 of the Protocol on the ACJHR and Article 4(h)
Constitutive Act of the AU legally obliges the ACJHR to expand its jurisdiction to
international crimes. 63 This is because Article 4(h) requires the AU "to
intervene.., in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore
peace and stability to the Member State of the [African] Union..." and Article 28
of the Protocol on the ACJHR requires the AU to attach itself to human rights
instruments. 64
Further, state parties to the Protocol on the ACJHR, the Assembly, the
Parliament, and organs of the AU, and any staff member of the AU can bring legal
disputes to the ACJHR.65 Also, the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights, African intergovernmental organizations, or any non-governmental
organizations relating to the state party to the Protocol on the ACJHR can submit
cases to the ACJHR for violation of human rights guaranteed under the African
Charter, Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, or the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in
59. U.N. Charter art. 41 (stating "The Security Council may decided what measures not involving
the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.").
60. Brett D. Schaefer & Steven Groves, The U.S. Should Not Join The International Criminal
Court, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Aug. 19, 2009),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/08/the-us-should-not-join-the-international-criminal-
court.
61. Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4, at art. 28.
62. Id.
63. See Terefa Degu, Regional Systems in Pursuing International Criminal Justice: An
Examination of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, ABYSSINIALAW (June 17, 2015),
http://www.abyssinialaw.com/blog-posts/item/1506-regional-systems-in-pursuing-international-
criminal-justice.
64. Abass, supra note 8, at 937. See also Constitutive Act of the AU, supra note 22, at art. 4(h).
65. Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4, at 19.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Africa.66
The Draft Protocol proposes to extend the ACJHR's jurisdiction to
international crimes, including those four crimes triable at the ICC and other
serious international crimes.67 Moreover, it also calls for establishing an Office of
Prosecutor and a Peace and Security Council. 68 It provides the Office of
Prosecutor with powers to initiate investigation while the Peace and Security
Council is authorized to submit cases to the ACJHR.69 Moreover, the ACJHR
contains two additional triggering powers, similar to that of the ICC, which are
State Party Referral 7° and the exercise of the pro prio motu powers.71
The Draft Protocol allows the court to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes
that occur in the territory of a State Party72 (operating on the territoriality principle),
crimes that occur on the vessel or aircraft of a State Party 73 (operating on the
territoriality principle), or the State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national74 (operating on the active nationality principle). Additionally, it assumes
jurisdiction over crimes where the victim is a national of a State Party 75 (operating
on the passive personality principle) or extraterritorial acts by non-nationals who
threaten a vital interest of a State Party 76 (operating on the protective principle).
IV. THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE DRAFT PROTOCOL AND ROME
STATUTE
A. The Incompatibility of Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol
Both the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol of the ACJHR are established
multilateral treaties, which are in conflict as the obligations under the Rome
Statute are incompatible to that of the Draft Protocol. This issue turns on the law
of termination and validity of treaties.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") regards the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") 77 as the customary international law in the
application of treaties. In the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project Case,78 the ICJ
stated clearly, in relation to issues of law relating to termination and validity of
treaties, that there is
66. Id. at art. 30(b), (d), (f).
67. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at annex art. 14 proposing to amend art. 28A,
11 -3.
68. Id. at annex art. 15.
69. ld at annex art. 15; Id. at annex art. 22 proposing to amend art. 46F, IT 2-3.
70. Id. at annex art. 22 proposing to amend art. 46F, 11.
71. ld at annex art. 46F, 13.
72. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, II 1-2(a).
73. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, 2(a).
74. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, 2(b).
75. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, 2(c).
76. Id. at annex art. 46E bis, 2(d).
77. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
78. Gabclkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slov.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (Sept. 25).
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... no need to dwell upon the question of applicability in the present
case of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties. It needs
only to be mindful of the fact that it has several times had occasion to
hold that some of the rules laid down in that Convention might be
considered as a codification of existing customary law.
79
It has been opined that the customary character of the provisions of VCLT is
applicable to provisions relating to the validity and termination of treaties.80 The
only caveat is seen in the ICJ decision of Case Concerning Armed Activities on the
Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda)s l where the ICJ
found that Article 66 of the VCLT did not represent customary international law, 82
but is irrelevant to the instant inquiry.
According to Article 59 of the VCLT, a treaty is incompatible with another if
they relate to the "same subject-matter., 83 Article 59 does not deal directly with
incompatibility of treaties but provides guidance in situation for incompatible
treaties where a subsequent treaty is signed and the obligations of these two
treaties overlap. 4 The International Law Commission has interpreted Article 59 to
mean that the "terms relating to the same subject matter must be strictly interpreted
that that the two treaties shall only be considered as covering the same matter if
their object is identical and presents a comparable degree of generality."8 5
These criteria are applicable to the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol.
Preambles of both treaties share many similarities. For example, paragraph 16 of
the Preamble of the Draft Protocol states that "the present Protocol will
complement national, regional and continental bodies and institutions in preventing
serious and massive violations of human and people rights in keeping with Article
58 of the [African] Charter [on Human and Peoples Rights] and ensuring
accountability for them whenever they occur." 86 This is similar to paragraph 5 of
the Preamble of the Rome Statute which states that the objective of the ICC is to
"put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute
to the prevention of such crimes." 87 Paragraph 10 of the Preamble of Draft
Protocol is also similar to paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the Rome Statute, where
79. Id. 46. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (S. Afr.) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. Rep. 16, 1 94 (June 21).
80. OLIVER CORTEN & PIERRE KLEIN, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES - A
COMMENTARY 1237 (2011).
81. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Rwanda) 2006 I.C.J. 6 1 125 (Feb. 3).
82. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (4th ed. 2010).
83. VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 59(1).
84. Id.
85. Francois Dubuisson, Article 59, in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, A
COMMENTARY 1336 (Olivier Coten & Peter Klein eds., 2011). See also Int'l Law Comm'n,
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, 229 - 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
86. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at pmbl.
87. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at pmbl.
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they emphasize respect for human life and the importance of refraining from the
use of force.
88
In fact, the Draft Protocol and the Rome Statute shared more common
features than just the objective, such as the language in the criminal elements of
the four international crimes, 89 the exercise of jurisdiction for prosecution, 90 and
the mode of jurisdiction. 9' These similarities create conflicts arising from state
obligations for parties to both instruments. One common example of conflicts
would be when both the ICC and the ACJHR would prosecute the same person
(national of Country A) for the same conduct related to the same crime, and both
courts have asked Country B (a state party to both the Rome Statute and the Draft
Protocol) to surrender the respective suspect to their respective courts. Ultimately,
Country B can only choose one court to surrender the suspect, which would
inevitably violate their treaty's obligation under the other instrument.
The impact of this conflict between can be shown clearly with reference to the
following. Although only five states have ratified the Draft Protocol so far,92 the
AU has thirty-two states 93 that are state parties to the Rome Statute. Thus, the
Draft Protocol has a potential to significantly impact the functionality of the ICC.
If thirty-two states withdraw from the Rome Statute or give superior jurisdiction to
the Draft Protocol, the jurisdiction of the ICC in Africa will be functionally
eliminated. For example, Kenya has passed a motion to withdraw from the ICC in
their national assembly on September 5, 2013. 94 Although no law implementing
such withdrawal was made, this has already forced the ICC to re-consider the
motion to consider proposed amendments to address AU's member states
concerns. 
95
88. Draft Protocol'on Amendments, supra note 10, at pmbl.; Rome Statute, supra note 14, at
pmbl.
89. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at art. 14, proposing to amend arts. 28B-D, M;
see also Rome Statute, supra note 14, at arts. 6-8bis. (Draft Protocol basically mirrors the language in
the Rome Statute).
90. The entities eligible to exercise jurisdiction are prosecutors, state-party referral-which is
unique in Rome Statute-and United Nations Security Council, except that it is Peace and Security
Council of the AU in Draft Protocol. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at art. 22,
proposing to amend art. 46F; see also Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 13.
91. Both the Draft Protocol and the Rome Statute are complementary to national courts. Draft
Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at art. 22 proposing to amend art. 46H; see also Rome Statute,
supra note 14, at art. 1.
92. Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4.
93. Rome Statute, supra note 14 (The States are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape
Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote
d'lvoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe).
94. Gabriel Gatehouse, Kenya MPs vote to withdraw from ICC, BBC NEWS (Sep. 5, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23969316.
95. Judie Kaberia, Win for Africa as Kenya agenda enters ICC's Assembly, CAPITAL NEWS (Nov.
20, 2013), http://www.capitalftn.co.ke/news/2013/ 1/win-for-africa-as-kenya-agenda-enters-icc-
assembly.
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This Draft Protocol creates an additional threat to the ICC as the ICC relies
mainly on the cooperation from state parties. Even states that wish to comply with
treaty obligations in good faith will be conflicted. The issue of who has superior
jurisdiction will inevitably arise.
B. Which instrument has superior jurisdiction?
1. Voluntary withdrawal
One way to resolve this conflict is by voluntary withdrawal. Article 127 of
the Rome Statute provides that State Parties can withdraw from the Rome Statute
by written notification one year from the date of the receipt of the notification.
96
To the contrary, both the Draft Protocol and the Protocol on ACJHR do not
provide any provisions regarding withdrawal of the treaty.
97
Article 54 of the VCLT provides that the party may expressly agree to
terminate any treaty.98 Article 54 of the VCLT states that:
The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take
place:
(a) In conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or
(b) At any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with
the other contracting States.99
Article 54(a) of the VCLT simply "serves as a reminder to the pacta sunt
servanda rule1 °° and affirms that this rule applies to the provision of the treaty
governing its termination or the withdrawal of a party." 101 On the other hand,
"Article 54(b) requires the fulfillment of two conditions to terminate a treaty or
allow a party to withdraw from it: first all parties must consent to the termination
or withdrawal; second, the other contracting States must be consulted."10 2
Under the current situation, because the Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty,
it is unlikely that all of the parties will terminate or withdraw from the Rome
Statute. This leaves countries that wish to withdraw from the Rome Statute the
option of exercising their rights under Article 54(a) of the VCLT and in
accordance with Article 127 of the Rome Statute.
However, not every state will make its stance clear. For those states that do
not withdraw from the Rome Statute, it may be implied that they intend the Rome
Statute to have superior jurisdiction. Yet, this creates ambiguity to jurisdictional
superiority. On the contrary, a mass withdrawal of State Parties to the Rome
Statute would seriously cripple the functionality of the ICC. After all, the
96. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 127 1.
97. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10; Protocol on ACJHR, supra note 4.
98. VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 54.
99. Id.
100. S.E. Nahlik, The Grounds of Invalidity and Termination of Treaties, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 736,
746 (1971).
101. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 1238.
102. Id.
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situations currently being pursued by the ICC are in Africa (with five out of seven
situations as self-referrals).10 3
2. Possibility of Auto-Termination of the Rome Statute
Assuming the States do not withdraw from Rome Statute and ratify the Draft
Protocol, this Draft Protocol will be ratified at a time later than the Rome Statute.
The later ratification triggers Article 59 of the VCLT, which provides for the
situation where the conclusion of a later treaty may impliedly terminate the earlier
treaty if the treaty obligations are in conflict.' 
04
Article 59 of the VCLT states that:
A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude
a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter and:
(a) It appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the
parties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty; or
(b) The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those
of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at
the same time.
10 5
Article 59 sets out a specific mode of termination or suspension of treaties:
the tacit abrogation or suspension of a treaty in the case of subsequently concluded
treaty. 106 This covers situations where all the parties to the treaty, without
expressly terminating or modifying an earlier treaty, must be considered to have
implicitly abrogated or suspended the first treaty because it was either the intention
of the parties to the treaty or the latter treaty is incompatible with the earlier one. 1
07
Nonetheless, Article 59 of the VCLT is not of much assistance regarding the
issue of conflicts between the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol because it is
unlikely that all the parties in the Rome Statute would withdraw. Therefore, it is
impossible to automatically terminate the Rome Statute should the Draft Protocol
pass. However, Article 59 of the VCLT merely establishes measures based on the
general principles stated in Article 54 of the VCLT: the parties to a treaty are
competent to terminate it by the way of any subsequent agreement. 108 It is
commented that the purpose of Article 59 is "to respond to a particular situation of
103. Wenke Brickner & Angar Verma, In Troubled Waters: The International Criminal Court
(ICC), in GLOBAL TRENDs 2015, 101 (2015) http://www.global-trends.info/fileadmin/Globale-
Trends/beitraege kapitel/gt-2015 en.pdf.
104. VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 59 1.
105. Id.
106. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 1326.
107. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp.
No. 9, at 203, U.N. Doc. A/5509 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 187, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.1 [hereinafter Report ILC, U.N. Doe. A/5509]; see also Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, at 252, U.N.
Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. I [hereinafter Report ILC, U.N. Doc. A/6309].
108. Richard Plender, The Role of Consent in the Termination of Treaties, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
133, 153 (1986).
VOL. 44:1
2015 CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ICC AND THE AFRICAN UNION 53
conflict between successive treaties ... it cannot cover problems of conflicts
between treaties, which imply the concurrent application of two treaties in
force."' 10 9 The interpretation of Article 59 is based on the rationale that "the States
concluding the second treaty are then fully competent to amend or annul the prior
treaty."' 10
Since it is only for parties intending to disregard their old agreement and enter
into a whole new agreement with the same parties to the earlier treaty, Article 59 is
not applicable here because the conflicts between the Rome Statute and the Draft
Protocol are more than mere modification. They are two separate treaties and the
ratification of Draft Protocol is in fact a breach of the treaty obligation to the Rome
Statute because the states ratifying the Draft Protocol would have taken away the
jurisdiction of the ICC. It cannot be said that "none of the parties' intention is to
have the first treaty incompatible with the second treaty."I'
From this perspective, this essentially raises "a question of the construction of
the two treaties in order to determine the extent of their incompatibility and the
intention of the parties.""12
3. Entering into the Draft Protocol may Result in a Breach of
International Law
It is a well-established principle that a country has the right of freely consent
to any treaty. 13 This is embraced by Article 34 of the VCLT, which states "[a]
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent." 114 This embodied the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
(agreements neither harm nor benefit third parties) and is founded on the principles
of sovereignty and independence of states. "
5
However, it does not mean a country shall neglect the treaty obligations they
have previously taken. Article 30 of the VCLT is applicable to parties who entered
into a treaty with conflicting obligations and do not want to actively withdraw
from their current treaty at the same time.
116
Article 30(4) of the VCLT is particularly relevant in this regard where it states
that:
(4) When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to
the earlier one:
(a) As between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in
109. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 1326; see also Sir H. Waldock (Special Rapporteur),
Third Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1 67 and Add.t-3 (1964), reprinted in [1964] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n I at 40.
110. Sir H. Waldock, supra note 109.
111. Report ILC, U.N. Doc. A/5509, supra note 107.
112. Id. at252-53.
113. VCLT, supra note 77, at pmbl (stating "the principles of free consent and of good faith.. .are
universally recognized..
114. Id. at art. 34.
115. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No. 5, 33 (Jul. 23).
116. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 888.
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paragraph 3;
(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only
one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs
their mutual rights and obligations. "1
7
Article 30(4) of the VCLT and subsequent case law essentially gives a
solution for the Draft Protocol and Rome Statute to co-exist together."l 8 Before
further application of Article 30(4) of the VCLT, it is important to understand the
background and rationale establishing Article 30.
The general principle under international law is that states that have
contracted themselves to an earlier treaty cannot contract into another treaty that
has conflicting treaty obligations. This is the opinion laid down in many
international cases, such as the Honduras-Nicaragua case. 19 In the Honduras-
Nicaragua case, Nicaragua entered into a treaty with the United States, which
violated the prior treaty rights Nicaragua entered into with El Salvador and Costa
Rica. The Central American Court of Justice was careful in balancing the freedom
of the country to conclude a later treaty at their will with the prior treaty obligation
and stated that:
without competence to declare the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty to be null
and void, as in effect, the high party complainant requests it to do when
it prays that the Government of Nicaragua be enjoined "to abstain from
fulfilling the said Bryan-Chamorro Treaty". . .To declare absolutely the
nullity of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, or to grant the lesser prayer for
the injunction of abstention, would be equivalent to adjudging and
deciding respecting the rights of the other party signatory to the treaty,
without having heard that other party and without its having submitted
to the jurisdiction of the Court. 20
The Central American Court of Justice thus held that Nicaragua should avail
"itself of all possible means provided by international law to reestablish and
maintain the legal status that existed prior to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between
litigant Republics."'
' 21
In fact, the above court holding was well embodied in Article 26 of VCLT as
a maxim pacta sunt servanda-every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith. 122 Article 26 restates the pillar of
treaty law, and together with the principle of free consent and good faith, they form
the three basic concepts in VCLT. 123 This maxim is important in international law
117. VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 30, 14.
118. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 789.
119. El Salvador v. Nicaragua, Judgment, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (Cent. Am. Ct. J. 1917).
120. Id. at 729.
121. Id.
122. OLIVER DORR & KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (3rd. ed. 2012) 427.
123. Christina Binder, The Pacta Sunt Servanda Rule in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties: A Pillar and Its Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND
FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 317, 317-21 (Isabelle Buffard &
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because it often requires cooperation between states; breaching the trust could
result in high levels of mistrust between state parties. This rationale was upheld by
the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") in the Lotus Case while
balancing the principle of free consent and pacta sunt servanda:
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own
free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a
view to the achievement of common aims. 
24
Thus, the freely given consent to be bound generates legal obligations
independent of any future changes in the sovereign will (ex consensu advenit
vinculum). 125 At the same time, many scholars also express the view that
prevailing consent-based theory, which is stated in the VCLT Preamble 3rd recital,
requires a preconditioned, legally binding rule that commands that treaties are to
be obeyed-pacta sunt servanda.126 In its famous Nuclear Tests judgment, the ICJ
interprets the terms 'good faith' to the very foundation of the pacta sunt servanda
principle:
One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of
legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.
Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, in
particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming
increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in
the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character
of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. 127
If a country enters into a treaty that concludes the same subject matter as the
previous one, the latter treaty is said to be tainted with illegality. This principle is
also reflected in Special Rapporteur Lauterpacht's comment during the
codification process of the VCLT where he stated that "if parties to a treaty bind
themselves to act in a manner which is a violation of the rights of a party under a
James Crawford ed., 2008).
124. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 1144 (Sep. 7).
125. Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/101 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 187, U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956Add.1, at art. 4, 1 ("The foundation of treaty obligation is consent, coupled with
the fundamental principle of law that consent gives rise to obligation."); cf Edwin M. Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, V1, 36 YALE L.J. 1039, 1086 (1927) (stating that "[o]nly new
international law.., rests on consent or agreement to be bound, and even then probably only for a
comparatively restricted period would the unwilling state be able to deny the force of a rule generally
accepted."). Critics include Leon Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 HARV. L.R. 1 139-44 (1917)
(explaining that even though the state's previous consent establishes rules of international law, the
present will of the state should be put higher than any International law); Alfred Verdross, Le
Fondement Du Droit International, 16 Recueil des Cours 251, 265-66 (1927).
126. 1 JOST DELBRUCK, in DIE GRUNDLAGEN. DIE VOLKERRECHTSSUBJEKTE 37 (Georg Dahm, Jost
Delbruck & Rudiger Wolfrum 2nd. ed., 1988); see also THOMAs FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 187 (3rd. ed. 1990).
127. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 473, para. 49 (Dec. 20).
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pre-existing treaty, they commit a legal wrong which taints the subsequent treaty
with illegality."' 128 Under this view, the conflict of the treaty obligation caused the
invalidity of the subsequent treaty. 129 Similar rationales and decisions are echoed
in later cases in the PCIJ including the Oscar Chinn Case 130 and the case of the
European Commission of the Danube.13 1
However, the taint of a subsequent treaty does not necessarily invalidate it.
The subsequent treaty is invalid "only if the departure of the terms of the prior
treaty is such as to interfere seriously with the interests of the other parties to that
treaty or seriously impair the original purpose of the treaty."' 
32
This is particularly relevant to a multilateral treaty because of the plurality of
interests of states and it emphasizes the difference of invalidity and that of
application of treaty because "incompatibility with the provisions of a previous
treaty gives rise prima facie to a conflict of obligation, rather than, necessarily, to
the invalidity of the treaties." 133 However, the conflicting provision between the
Draft Protocol and the Rome Statute is the jurisdiction of the ICC. This is fatal to
the operation of the Draft Protocol because this constructively invalidates the Draft
Protocol's ability to function.
Therefore, freedom to consent is not unlimited and it has its obligations and
boundaries. By ratifying the Draft Protocol, the states will breach the obligation
owed under the Rome Statute and impair the function of the ICC. Professor
William Schabas commented that "[a]lready, the International Criminal Court is
the international justice institution that can make the most credible claim to a
demonstrable deterrent effect."' 34 Taking the freedom to consent to ratify the Draft
Protocol and not fulfilling the obligations to the Rome Statute will have
detrimental effect on fighting international crime. As such, it seems to satisfy the
standard set out by Lauterpacht and the later ratification may be invalidated
because it impairs the object and purpose of entering into the Rome Statute.
Furthermore, states are free to invoke Article 127 of the Rome Statue to opt
out from their treaty's obligation;' 35 failing to do so may give superior jurisdiction
to the ICC. 136 Mali is an example. Mali is a state party to the Rome Statute 137 and
it is also one of the five state parties to the Protocol on ACJHR. 138 Presumably, it
will also ratify the Draft Protocol. However, Mali has shown its intention to be
128. H. Lauterpacht (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63
(1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n I at 156.
129. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 772.
130. Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 80 (Dec. 12).
131. Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube Between Galatz and Braila, Advisory
Opinion, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 14, at 23 (Dec. 8).
132. Lauterpacht, supra note 127, at 93, 156.
133. CORTEN & KLEIN, supra note 80, at 773.
134. WILLIAM SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 44.
135. See Rome Statute, supra note 14.
136. Seeid.
137. Id.
138. List of Countries, supra note 24, at 2.
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bound by the jurisdiction of the ICC since it has made a self-referral under the
Rome Statute. 139 Yet, invoking Article 127 may not mean the withdrawal from the
jurisdiction of the ICC because jurisprudence indicates the non-reciprocity of
human rights conventions, as will be discussed in further detail below.
4. Violations of the Non-Reciprocity of Human Rights Conventions
Cases and customs show that human rights conventions also have a special
status in international law-non-reciprocal obligations. Non-reciprocal obligations
"do not result in the exchange of direct, reciprocal benefits owed to the other States
Parties but in the performance of the treaty for the benefit of the community good,
which is tantamount to an 'immaterial' benefit of each State Party."' 140 This is
because, when dealing with Article 30 of the VCLT, the ICJ held in its Advisory
Opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and the
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that:
In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of
their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely,
the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'tre
of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one
cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of
the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and
duties.'
4 1
This holding is also reflected in Article 60(5) of the VCLT which states that
the termination of treaties due to breaches will not apply to human rights
conventions due to the protection of human persons contained in treatises of a
humanitarian character.'
42
The International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia also corroborates
this approach and held in Kupregkic case that:
The absolute nature of most obligations imposed by rules of
international humanitarian law reflects the progressive trend towards the
so-called "humanization" of international legal obligations, which refers
to the general erosion of the role of reciprocity in the application of
humanitarian law over the last century. [. ..] Unlike other international
norms, such as those of commercial treaties which can legitimately be
based on the protection of reciprocal interests of States, compliance with
humanitarian rules could not be made dependent on a reciprocal or
corresponding performance of these obligations by other States. This
139. Situation in the Republic of Mali, Case No. ICC-01/12-1, Decision Assigning the Situation in
the Republic of Mali to Pre-Trial Chamber I1 (July 19, 2012).
140. DORR & SCHMALENBACH, supra note 121 at 442; see also Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The
Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International
Responsibility, 13 EUR. J TNT. L. 1127 (2002).
141. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 23 (May 28).
142. VCLT, supra note 77.
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trend marks the translation into legal norms of the "categorical
imperative" formulated by Kant in the field of morals: one ought to
fulfill an obligation regardless of whether others comply with it or
disregard it.
143
Therefore, it may not be the practice of the ICC to give away suspects if the
ACJHR fails in fighting impunity because "no State Party to the Rome Statute
would be expected to negotiate an agreement with another government that would
facilitate a suspect's impunity from all forums of justice for the atrocity crimes that
the ICC is designed to investigate and prosecute ... Article 98 sets forth the
exceptions to the rule of surrender but it does not seek to deny the Rome Statute's
core purpose of fighting impunity."'14
Consequently, even if Article 98 of the Rome Statute is invoked in requesting
for the surrender of the suspect and if the ACJHR does not prosecute properly with
reference to the admissibility requirement laid down in Article 17(2) of the Rome
Statute or in compliance with international standards, the ICC can still assume the
jurisdiction, theoretically and legally, because it is distinguishable from a classic
situation under the Rome Statute Article 98.145
By the entering into the Draft Protocol, state parties are provided with an
additional option for forum shopping, which is contrary to the object and purpose
of the Rome Statute. There are at least three forums to conduct a trial: the ICC, the
ACJHR, and the national court of the state party. The framers of the Rome Statute
foresaw the risk of forum shopping when they put complementarity protections in
the treaty. 146 However, the ACJHR is not bound by complementary rules, only the
more general principles laid down in the VCLT.147 Assuming there is a sham trial
going on in the ACJHR by unjustified delay 148 or shielding of the accused, 149 this
second treaty entered into by the states will not be valid because this is a scheme
agreed between different states to seriously deviate from the original purpose of
the Rome Statute. 150 Forum shopping is, thus, incompatible with the objective of
ending impunity.
5. Resolution of the Dilemma
In the event the Draft Protocol is consistent with international norms, then it
143. Prosecutor v. Kupretkic, Case No. lT-95-16-T, Decision In The Trial Chamber, 1 518 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
144. David Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America's Original Intent, 3 J. INT'L CT.
JUST. 333, 336 (2005).
145. See generally id. (explaining the purpose and situation contemplated under Article 98(1) and
Article 98(2)). See also Questions & Answers: U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreements or So-called
"Article 98" Agreements, Coalition for the Int'l Crim. Ct., http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-
BIAsQ&Acurrent.pdf.
146. See Rome Statute, supra note 14.
147. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 344-49; see generally VCLT supra note 77.
148. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17(2).
149. Id.
150. See VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
720 (2009).
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must be reconciled with the ICC's jurisdiction. Therefore, when dealing with the
Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol, the key is to find out what provisions in these
two treaties are incompatible and if they are dealing with the same subject matter.
The International Law Commission's study on Fragmentation in International Law
states "the test of whether two treaties deal with the 'same subject matter' is
resolved through the assessment of whether fulfillment of the obligation under one
treaty affects the fulfillment of the obligation of another."'' l This effect might
then take place either as strictly preventing the fulfillment of the other obligation
or undermining its object and purpose in one way or another. 152 It is proven in the
previous sections that both treaties' obligations are in conflict.
According to Article 30(4)(a), for states who are parties to both treaties under
this situation, it is opined that the two treaties co-exist to the extent that their
provisions are not incompatible with each other. 153 If the provisions cannot be
applied simultaneously, the earlier treaty will be terminated or suspended
according to Article 59 (lex posterior-rule).5 4 Article 30(4)(b) concerns situations
as between state parties to both treaties and a state party to only one of the
treaties.155 It provides that the treaty which both states are party to govern their
mutual rights and obligations.1
56
Therefore, according to article 30(4)(b), only one set of treaty obligation will
govern the situation at any given time. 57 The difficulty lies in Article 30(4)(a) and
in figuring out a method for both treaties to co-exist, especially under the current
complementarity regime of the ICC. Article 98 of the Rome Statute adds weight to
the difficulty because it obliges the ICC not to proceed with a request for surrender
or assistance that would require the requested state to act inconsistently with their
obligations under international agreements 158 or international law. 159 Assuming the
ICC applies Article 98 to the case, different situations can be set out to see what
may happen.
i. Situation 1:
Country A is party to both the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol. Suspect
A is a national of country A. Suspect A flees to Country B where it is only party to
the Rome Statute. Under this situation, Country B only has the obligation to
surrender suspect A to the ICC (or to the national jurisdiction if there is an
extradition treaty under Article 98 of the Rome Statute and it passes the
151. Int'l Law Comm'n, on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the
diversification and expansion of International Law of Its Fifty-Eight Session, 254, U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/L.682 (2006).
152. ld. 1253.
153. VILLIGER, supra note 149, at 406.
154. Id.
155. See VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 30(4)(b).
156. Seeid.
157. Id.
158. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 98(1).
159. Id. at art. 98(2).
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complementary requirement). If Country B were only a party to the Draft protocol,
then Country B would be obliged to surrender the suspect to the ACJHR (or their
national jurisdiction if they satisfy the complementarity requirement under the
Draft Protocol). 160
ii. Situation 2:
Country A is party to both the Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol. Suspect
A is a national of Country A. Suspect A flees to Country B, which is a party to the
Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol. Under this situation, Country B has to decide
who has priority to prosecute. Under Article 98 of the Rome Statute, Country B
has no choice but to surrender Suspect A to the ACJHR because Country B is
bound by international obligations to surrender the suspect under the Draft
Protocol (or to the national jurisdiction if there is an extradition treaty and the
national court satisfies the complementarity requirement under the Draft
Protocol). 161
iii. Situation 3:
Country A is only a party to the Rome Statute, but it is a member of the AU.
Suspect A is the national of Country A. Suspect A committed a relevant crime
within its own country and Country B. Country B is only a party to the Draft
Protocol. Under this situation, there will be concurrent jurisdiction because either
court has the absolute right over jurisdiction to prosecute: the ACJHR can operate
on the territoriality principle while the ICC can operate on the nationality principle.
At the same time, Country A is not bound by international obligation to surrender
the suspect to the ACJHR, thus Article 98 of the Rome Statute will not apply.
6. Concurrent Jurisdiction-Different Approaches to Solving the
Disputes
"The fact that there are different grounds of jurisdiction means that several
states have concurrent jurisdiction over a particular person or event."' 62 Situation
3 (above) illustrates the concept of concurrent jurisdiction. Currently, there is no
set of rules in international law to solve disputes over jurisdiction between
international courts. Judge Fitzmaurice stated in Barcelona Traction Case:
.. under present conditions, international law does not impose hard and
fast rules on States delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction .... It
does however.., involve for every State an obligation to exercise
moderation and restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by
its courts in cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue
encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more
appropriately exercisable by another State.
63
160. See VCLT, supra note 77, at art. 30(4)(a).
161. See VCLT, supra note 141, art. 30(4)(b).
162. KACZOROWSKA, supra note 82, at 338.
163. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970
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While international law does not provide much guidance on jurisdictional
disputes between international courts, one can draw reference to the different
approaches adopted by national courts.'64
There are several relevant principles in international law resolving disputes
between national courts for guidance, including genuine connection,
proportionality, and responsibility to protect.165 The ICJ stated in the Nottebohm
Case that the genuine connection requires "the legal bond of nationality accord
with the individual's genuine connection with the State which assumes the
defence... 1 66 The rationale behind this principle is to require a significant nexus
between the regulated matter and the regulating organization. 167 This must be
discerned in order for that organization to be authorized to assert its jurisdiction. '
68
Proportionality is a legal principle or a "measure used to achieve an
objective.. .that is, properly related in size or degree to that objective." 69 This
principle may prohibit a state from asserting its jurisdiction over a situation, which
arises in another state, by using unjustified intervention, as proportionality requires
an interest-balancing exercise in a way that a state would not encroach upon the
interests of another state or to an extent that is disproportionate. 170 Proportionality
has been applied in the law of the World Trade Organization.171 Responsibility to
Protect is that "if a state 'manifestly' fails to protect its population, the
responsibility and authority to do so shifts to the international community."' 172 It
operates on a broader scope than humanitarian intervention 173 and encompasses
responsibility to prevent conflict, 174 to react to conflict, 175 and to rebuild after
conflict. 176 The Responsibility to Protect concept has been incorporated into
l.C.J. Rep. 3, 70. (Feb. 5) (separate opinion by Fitzmaurice, J.).
164. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Annexed to U. N. Charter, 1945 I.C.J. 26, art.
38; see KACZOROWSKA, supra note 82, at 339.
165. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (2008).
166. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 23, (Apr. 6).
167. See id.
168. RYNGAERT, supra note 164, at 146.
169. Id. at 158
170. Id. (providing the example that proportionality can be "invoked in the law of war, which
prohibits States from mounting 'an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians.. which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipate.' It may also play a role in the field of countermeasures...").
171. Id.; Axel Desmedt, Proportionality in WTO Law, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 441(2001).
172. ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1
(2011). See also G.A. Res. 60/1 1 139 (Oct. 24, 2005).
173. Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, Address at the
John Vincent Memorial Lecture at Keele University (Feb. 26, 1993), in Int'l Aff., July 1993, at 429,
445 (stating that humanitarian intervention may be summed up as military intervention in a state,
without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death
among the inhabitants.).
174. See G.A. Res. 60/1 139 (Oct. 24, 2005) (discussing that the responsibility to prevent
includes, amongst others, surveillance).
175. See G.A. Res. 60/1 140 (Oct. 24, 2005) (discussing that the responsibility to react includes
the use of force).
176. See G.A. Res. 60/1 141 (Oct. 24, 2005) (discussing that the responsibility to rebuild
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United Nations policy 177 and is central to the international community, focusing on
the preventive measure. 178 This is applicable to gross human rights violations and
courts can assume jurisdiction over internationally harmful activities originating in
their territory. 17 9 Thus, the United Nations Security Council can intervene (under
Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter) to protect at risk populations
when the states fails to protect. 180
In contrast, the approach adopted by United States' courts makes reference to
a reasonableness standard. The forum takes account of the different factors set out
in the U.S. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law to decide whether it
is reasonable for U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction in a particular case. The factors
include: (1) links of the activity to the territory of the regulating state; (2) the
connections, such as the nationality; (3) residence or economic activity; (4) the
character of the activity to be regulated; (5) the importance of the regulation to the
regulating state; (6) the extent to which other states regulate such activities; (7) the
importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or economic system;
and (8) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.' 8' The
courts, even when reasonableness is satisfied, can reject jurisdiction on the grounds
of comity.
182
However, these jurisdictional bases have very limited application because
international courts have no "connections" in the conventional sense. Most
importantly, genuine connection and proportionality are impossible to eliminate
cases with jurisdictional competency because both the ICC and the ACJHR are
equally competent to exercise jurisdiction. The Responsibility to Protect has also
been criticized as an overly ambitious concept because its broad scope of operation
gives a legal basis for military adventurism. 183 At the same time, the U.S.
includes development assistance, administration, and punishment).
177. See generally RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY: FROM
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2006) (discussing that responsibility to
protect is a central policy in the U.N. policy community). See also U.N. Secretary-General, Address to
the Summit of the Africa Union, (January 31, 2008),
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/lndex.asp?nid=2978 (Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that he
would "spare no effort to operationalize the Responsibility to protect" and subsequently handed in a
report to the General Assembly on plans for implementing the Responsibility to Protect on Jan. 12,
2009, found in infra note 176).
178. See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 1 18, U.N. Doc.
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (stating that "implementing the responsibility to protect will focus upon
prevention, capacity-building and assistance to states as the bases for implementing the responsibility to
protect concept.").
179. See id. at 11 0(b).
180. See U.N. Charter art. 41-42.
181. U.S. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §403(2)(a)-(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1987). See also U.S. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
182. See Laurittzen v. Larsen 345 U.S. 571, 582, 585-86 (1953).
183. See Ronda Hauben, The Justification to Wage War: Libya and U.N. Security Resolution 1973,
GLOBAL RESEARCH (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-justification-to-wage-war-libya-
and-un-security-resolution-1973/28230 (discussing that responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a "dangerous
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approach is unable to properly establish a system to filter out cases on
jurisdictional disputes between competing international courts.
Another more idealistic approach is that courts should "exercise their
jurisdiction with a view to furthering the interests of the international community
rather to advancing their own interests."' 84 It proposes that instead of relying on
the strongest nexus between the case and the forum, states should be entitled to
exercise subsidiary jurisdiction over persons and events in a situation where a state
with the strongest nexus fails to deal adequately with the case. 185 In fact, the Rome
Statute has been exercising this "subsidiary jurisdiction" if the national prosecution
is impartial or is not independent, or if the prosecution is shielding the accused, or
if the case has been delayed without justification.1 86 This "subsidiary jurisdiction"
is known as the complementary regime. 181 Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute
allows the ICC to exercise the jurisdiction if states fail to prosecute. 188 However,
even though the ACJHR did not fail to prosecute, the geographical location and
component of the ACJHR has already increased the possibility of bias and conflict
of interest to the trials conducted in ACJHR because they are connected to the
states in Africa. The relative lack of funding in the ACJHR is also a problem to its
establishment of the ACJHR, which would be difficult to provide an unbiased
forum for trials at the ACJHR. 8 9
Furthermore, Article 98 of the Rome Statute limits the authority of Article
17(2) because the state is constrained from sending the accused to the ICC if it is
bound by international agreement or law to send the accused to another state.
190
Thus, the result arising from the conflict of jurisdiction between the ACJHR and
the ICC is forum shopping.
As described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
The concern surrounding forum shopping stems from the fear that a
plaintiff will be able to determine the outcome of a case simply by
choosing the forum in which to bring the suit ... raising the fear that
applying the law sought by a forum-shopping plaintiff will defeat the
expectations of the defendant or will upset the policies of the state in
which the defendant acted (or from which the defendant hails)."' 9'
concept").
184. RYNGAERT, supra note 163, at 227.
185. Id.
186. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17(2).
187. See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 344-49.
188. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 17(2).
189. See generally International Monetary Fund, Report on the GDP by Continents, (Apr. 11,
2014), http://www.imf.org/extemal/country/index.htm (illustrating that African States has the lowest
GDP amongst Asia, Europe, North America and South America). See also Jon Silverman, Ten Years,
$900M, One Verdict, Does the 1CC cost too much?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17351946 (last visited on Oct. 6, 2015) (discussing that the 122
state parties to the ICC paid U.S.D. $140M over ten years for the operation at the ICC. Arguably, the
African States may lack the funding to establish a court that is unbiased and just for the accused).
190. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 98.
191. Sheldon v. PHH Corp., 135 F.3d 848, 855 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Olmstead v. Anderson, 428
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Therefore, the accused may have the option to choose the most favorable
forum to try his own case if the Draft Protocol comes into force and this is
incompatible with the objective of international justice.' 92
Although this approach may not be practical, it nonetheless provides a
possible idea to allow the ICC to exercise "the subsidiary jurisdiction" if the
ACJHR fails to prosecute. However, all these jurisdictional bases have their
limitations. Nonetheless, by falling back on international law as discussed above,
the ACJHR may not be in conformity with international norms and may have a
difficulty in getting jurisdictional superiority.
V. CONCLUSION
The Rome Statute and the Draft Protocol are incompatible because the Draft
Protocol fragments the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Draft Protocol satisfies the
standard of incompatibility because it has identical objectives and shares a
comparable degree of generality with the Rome Statute. This is shown in the
Preamble of the Draft Protocol and the Preamble of the Rome Statute where they
aim at ending impunity. 193 This is fatal to the function of the ICC in Africa
because all of the current situations in the ICC now are in Africa. It would greatly
impact the ICC.
Yet African States are free to enter into the Draft Protocol but this creates the
problem of jurisdictional superiority. One way to solve this dispute is by voluntary
withdrawal. The African States can withdraw from the Rome Statute by invoking
Article 127 of the Rome Statute in accordance with article 54 of the VCLT.
194
This paper also rejects the possibility of auto-termination of the Rome Statute
because it is unlikely that all the state parties to the Rome Statute withdraw from it.
However, this does not mean the withdrawal from the Rome Statute and the
subsequent ratification of the Draft Protocol is in conformity with international
norms. This may result in breaches of international norms, since Article 26 of the
VCLT requires the African States to perform treaty obligation with good faith
(pacta sunt servanda). 195 Performing treaty obligations with good faith is
important in international relations because breaching the trust will result in a high
level of distrust between different states. The freedom to consent also binds the
parties to the treaty that they have ratified. Therefore, entering into a treaty that
concludes the same subject matter as the previous one may taint the latter treaty
with illegality. Since the conflicting provision between the Draft Protocol and the
Rome Statute is jurisdictional, this constructively invalidates the Draft Protocol's
functionality. This conclusion is also implied by the fact that states are free to
Mich. 1, 400 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 1987)).
192. In most cases, the accused is the head of state; therefore if the country decides to prosecute the
accused and the prosecution is a sham, the underlying effect is that the accused may be able to forum
shop.
193. Draft Protocol on Amendments, supra note 10, at pmbl.; Rome Statute, supra note 14, at
pmbl.
194. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 127; VCLT, supra note 77 at art. 54.
195. VCLT, supra note 77 at art. 26.
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withdraw from the Rome Statute under Article 127; 196 failing to do so will create
ambiguity as to superior jurisdiction. Mali is the example here.
Further, the non-reciprocity of the human rights convention also bars the
African States from withdrawing. This is because human rights conventions do
not have an exchange of interests between state parties; it is for the interests of
human beings and the international community as a whole. Human rights run with
land and, once assumed, are irrevocable and cannot be removed under subsequent
instruments, treaties, or agreements. This is reflected in the Article 60(5) of the
VCLT and the Kupreskic case.'
97
Nonetheless, if states insist on entering into the Draft Protocol, Article 98 of
the Rome Statute would be the greatest bar for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction
because it restricts states from sending the accused if there is a competing request
by international law or agreement. 198 This will result in forum shopping where the
accused can predict the outcome of the trial by selecting a favorable jurisdiction
for trial. This is incompatible with the objective to end impunity. Although the
ICC can distinguish Article 98 by the reason of forum shopping and invalidity of
the Draft Protocol (e.g. the ACJHR is merely used as a plan or scheme to delay
prosecution) from its usual application, the basis is debatable. Article 98 has
proven to be an obstacle for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction in other areas as
well, including head of state immunity and extradition agreement. 199 This has also
been proven to be an obstacle in the recent Omar Al-Bashir event in South Africa
where the South African Government refused to extradite Omar Al-Bashir.
2 °°
The next Review Conference for the Rome Statute is scheduled in 2017 .20,
The state parties to the Rome Statute should consider whether Article 98 of the
Rome Statue should be removed (perhaps making allowances for state parties to
make reservations to this change). Article 98 did not fulfill its purpose as
discussed during the negotiation 20 2 and did not provide any constructive function to
help fulfill the objective of the ICC. This has limited the ICC's jurisdiction.2 °3
Since Article 98 has lost its meaning and restrains the ICC from exercising
jurisdiction, Article 98 should be removed in the next amendment.
196. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 127.
197. VCLT, supra note 77 at art. 60(5). See also Prosecutor v. Kupre~kic, supra note 143, at 11520.
198. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 98(1)-(2).
199. See generally Dapo Akande, Head of State Immunity is a Part of State Immunity: A Response
to Jens Iverson, EJIL: TALK, http://www.ejiltalk.org/head-of-state-immunity-is-a-part-of-state-
immunity-a-response-to-jens-iverson (last visited on Oct. 4, 2015).
200. See Bill Corcoran, South African Government Loses Appeal Over Not Arresting Sudan
President, THE IRISH TIMES (Sep. 16, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/south-
african-govemment-loses-appeal-over-not-arresting-sudan-president- 1.2354106.
201. Coalition for International Criminal Court, Review Conference of the Rome Statute,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod-review (last visited on Oct. 4, 2015).
202. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 1037; see also David J. Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective on
the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); MARK D. KIELSGARD, RELUCTANT
ENGAGEMENT- U.S. POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 130 (2010).
203. KIELSGARD, supra note 194; see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 1038.
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The objective of the ICC is to end impunity, regardless of the forum. 2°4 If the
ACJHR is exercising its criminal jurisdiction with integrity while upholding
criminal justice, it should be encouraged. It is the reason why the ICC has adopted
the complementarity regime. The spirit of the preamble was explicitly reiterated
by former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, who observed that, "the absence of trials
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national
institutions, would be a major success. ' '20 5 However, if the ACJHR is a cynical
effort at forum shopping designed to allow impunity for crimes committed by
international leadership, it must be unmasked and the ICC must be allowed to carry
on its historical task. Hopefully, the establishment of the ACJHR will not be fatal
to the efforts of fighting international crimes and the objective to end impunity.
204. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at prmbl.
205. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/MorenoOcampol6June03.pdf, (last
visited on Oct. 6, 2015).
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THE MEANING OF "GROSS VIOLATION" OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A
Focus ON INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS' DECISIONS OVER THE
DRC CONFLICTS
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1. INTRODUCTION
In December 2005, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") delivered a
judgment on the case-between the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC")
and Uganda--concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,
declaring that the killings, tortures, and destruction of properties of the DRC
civilian population by Uganda and its army constituted "massive human rights
violations."' Two years earlier (in March 2003), the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights ("African Commission") had also issued a decisiorl in
response to a call to adjudicate on the same situation of armed conflicts in the DRC
(DRC v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda case) where it described the actions of the
respondent states as "flagrant violations" of human rights.2 Yet in their respective
rulings, the two judicial bodies failed to define what specifically constituted a
"massive violation" or "flagrant violation" of human rights. Additionally, both the
* Roger-Claude Liwange is a Fellow at Harvard University's FXB Center for Health and Human
Rights; Lecturer of International Law of War at Suffolk University Law School; SJD candidate (Suffolk
University); LL.M (University of Cape Town); and Licence en Droit (Universitd Protestante au Congo).
This article is an adaptation of a paper presented as part of a directed study at Suffolk Law School in
2015.
1. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, 206-07 (Dec. 19).
2. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda Uganda, Decision 227/99, African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights [Aft. Comm'n H.P.R.], 79-80 (May 15-29, 2003),
http://caselaw.ihrda.org/doc/227.99/view/en. As background information on the cases relating to the
armed conflicts in the DRC: In February 1999, the DRC lodged a complaint to the African Commission
on Human and People's Rights and claimed, among other things, that it was the victim of an armed
aggression perpetrated by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda; and that the armed forces of those three
countries also perpetrated gross violations of the human rights against its population since August 1998.
See CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 245 (3rd ed., 2014).
Concurrently, in June of 1999, the DRC also lodged another complaint before the ICJ against the same
countries concerning the same events and the same issues (act of armed aggression on its territory and
violation of the human rights of its civilian population). See TOMUSCHAT, supra note 2. The African
Commission and the ICJ have respectively issued their decisions in 2003 and 2005 in regards with the
DRC cases. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda Uganda, Decision 227/99, African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights [Aft. Comm'n H.P.R.]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 l.C.J. Rep. 6 (Feb. 3); Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168 (Dec. 19);
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi), Application: Instituting
Proceedings, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 117 (June 23).
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ICJ and African Commission did not clearly establish the criteria that led them to
conclude the killings and tortures against the DRC population were effectively
"massive/flagrant violations" rather than "regular violations" of human rights.
This silence has raised some questions as to: What makes some acts of killing to be
perceived as "massive" or "flagrant" violations of human rights while other acts of
killing are just "regular violations" of individuals' right to life? What are the
parallels between the terms "flagrant," "massive," "gross," "systematic," and
"serious" violations of human rights?
The paper explores the meaning of "gross violation" of human rights and
examines the criteria making a given violation to be ascertained as a "gross
violation" of human rights. This paper posits that the terms "gross," "flagrant,"
"massive," "systematic," or "serious" violations of human rights are often
interchangeably or cumulatively used by both international legal instruments and
quasi-judicial bodies in order to refer to a violation of the same gravity.3 The
paper also suggests that, even though there is no unanimous definition of the
concept "gross violations" of human rights, the scope of coverage of this concept
concerns the violations of two categories of rights, namely civil and political rights
and socio-economic rights. The paper concludes that several elements need to be
taken into account while assessing the seriousness of a violation, including: the
type of the violated rights and the character of the violation, the quantity of
victims, the repeated occurrence of the violation and its planning, and the failure of
the government to take appropriate measures relating to the violation in question.4
This paper is divided into two main parts. Section I will examine the different
definitions of "gross violation" of human rights as suggested by international legal
documents and scholars. Section II will analyze the criteria of classification of
"gross violation" of human rights in light of recent international and regional
jurisprudence.
II. DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF "GROSS VIOLATION" OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The term "gross violation" of human rights draws its origin from different
international and regional legal instruments within different legal systems.
International and regional legal instruments and judicial bodies are inconsistent in
their language when referring to the term "gross violation" of human rights.
5
3. Takhmina Karimova, What Amounts To 'A Serious Violation of International Human Rights
Law?: An Analysis of Practice and Expert Opinion for the Purpose of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty, in
ACADEMY BRIEFING NO. 6, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 12 (Geneva Academy, 2014), http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/Briefings%20and%201n%20breifs/Biefing/o2O6%2OWhat%20is%20a%
20serious%20violation%20ol/o20human%20rights%201aw Academy%20Briefing%/o20No%206.pdf.
See generally, Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, at 283-85 (2001).
4. CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: GROSS, SYSTEMATIC
VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 11 (1988). See also M. E. Tardu, United Nations
Response to Gross Violations of Human Rights: The 1503 Procedure, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 559,
582-84 (1980).
5. Karimova, supra note 3, at 12.
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These international legal instruments and judicial bodies have been using
interchangeably and cumulatively the terms "gross," "grave," "flagrant,"
"massive," "systematic," and "serious." For instance, the 1967 U.N. Resolution
1235 of the Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC") compelled the U.N.
Commission "to examine information relevant to gross violations of human
rights.., as exemplified by the policy of apartheid.",6  The 1984 Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
cumulatively speaks of "gross, flagrant or mass" violations of human rights in
connection with torture, 7 the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action
refers to "gross and systematic violations" of human rights; 8 and the 2005 U.N.
Basic Principles and Guidelines uses the term "gross" and "serious violations" to
qualify the gravity of the violations. 9 Likewise, international and regional judicial
bodies have also employed different terminologies when talking about certain acts
violating international laws: the ICJ talks of "massive human rights violations" in
the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v.
Uganda).l0 The African Commission and the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights ("ACtHPR") utilize interchangeably the terms "gross," "grave,"
"flagrant," "serious," or "massive;""1 and the European Court of Human Rights
("ECtHR") and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACtHR") refer to
"serious violation" to depict the gravity of some acts. 12
6. Economic and Social Council Res. 1235 (XLII) U.N. Doc E/4393 (June 6, 1967).
7. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 5,112, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
8. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 30, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (Jun. 25, 1993).
9. G.A. Res. 60/147, preamble, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines].
10. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 207 (Dec. 19).
I1. See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda Uganda, Decision 227/99, African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Comm'n H.P.R.], 79-80. See also Centre for Minority Rights
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya,
Decision 276/03, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Comm'n H.P.R.], In. 120
(Nov. 11-25, 2009) (using terms "grave" and "gross" violations of human rights to refer to the forced
evictions); Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v.
Sudan, Decision 279/03-296/05, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Comm'n
H.P.R.], 100-102 (May 13-27, 2009) (employing the term "serious and massive violations" to
characterize the situation where about ten thousand people were forcibly evicted from their properties).
12. The European Court of Human Rights has respectively upheld that the attitudes of Bulgaria
and Romania amounted "serious violations" under the European Convention of Human Rights.
Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, 192; Velikova v. Bulgaria,
2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 31. The IACtHR employed the term "grave" human rights violations to refer
to the extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances occurred respectively in Colombia and
Guatemala. Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser
C) No. 190, 53 (Nov. 26, 2008); Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, 143 (Jan. 31, 2006). The IACtHR used "serious
violations" to qualify acts of torture. Vera-Vera et al. v. Ecuador, Prelim. Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 226, 117 (May 19, 2011).
2015
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It should be noted that, while using interchangeably and cumulatively the
concepts of "gross," "massive" or "serious," both the international instruments and
judicial bodies have always failed to distinguish between the content of each
concept.' 3 This may lead one to conclude that, under international law, the epithets
"gross," "grave" "flagrant" or "serious" have the same meaning in terms of
qualifying the gravity of certain human rights violations. However, for the purpose
of this paper, the term "gross violation of human rights" will be preferably used for
the sake of uniformity of terminology. But, beyond the issue relating to the use of
terminology, the most important problem is to understand the meaning of the
concept itself. What does "gross violation" of human rights mean?
There is no universally accepted definition of the term "gross violation" of
human rights, nor is there a formally determined content of the concept itself.1
4
The existing definitions of "gross violation" of human rights are provided by
quasi-legal instruments that lack a binding effect (such as the declarations and
guidelines of the U.N. or EU's commissions and agencies), rather than treaties
with binding effects. For instance, Paragraph 30 of the 1993 U.N. Vienna
Declaration and Program of Action provides an enumeration of acts that should
constitute "gross violation" of human rights by stating that:
Gross and systematic violations.. .include, as well as torture and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary and arbitrary
executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, all forms of racism,
racial discrimination and apartheid, foreign occupation and alien
domination, xenophobia, poverty, hunger and other denials of economic,
social and cultural rights, religious intolerance, terrorism, discrimination
against women and lack of the rule of law. 1
5
Likewise, the Council of Europe's Guidelines on Eradicating Impunity for
Serious Human Rights Violations catalogued acts comprising "gross violation" of
human rights. 16  Scholars such as Stanislav Chemichenko and Theo Van Boven
have also proposed some definitions of "gross violation" of human rights. In his
Working Paper submitted to the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Chernichenko noted that
gross and large-scale human rights violations... [should include] murder,
13. Karimova, supra note 3, at 12.
14. Id.
15. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1 30,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 157/23 (June 25, 1993).
16. Guidelines on Eradicating Impunity for Serious Human Rights Violations, at 23, COM (2011)
13 add (Mar. 30, 2011), stipulates:
For the purposes of these guidelines, "serious human rights violations" concern those acts in
respect of which states have an obligation under the Convention, and in the light of the
Court's case-law, to enact criminal law provisions. Such obligations arise in the context of
the right to life (Article 2 of the Convention), the prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3 of the Convention), the prohibition of forced
labour and slavery (Article 4 of the Convention) and with regard to certain aspects of the
right to liberty and security (Article 5, paragraph I, of the Convention) and of the right to
respect for private and family life (Article 8 of the Convention).
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including arbitrary execution; torture; genocide; apartheid; discrimination on
racial, national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious grounds; establishing or maintaining
over persons the status of slavery servitude, or forced labour; enforced or
involuntary disappearances; arbitrary and prolonged detention; deportation or
forcible transfer of population."' 
7
Chernichenko's definition of "gross violation" of human rights is relatively
similar to the one suggested by Van Boven.' 
8
Two observations can be made from all of the above definitions. First, there
is no exhaustive list of violations that may constitute "gross violation" of human
rights; meaning that the term "gross violation" of human rights includes panoply of
violations. Second, the scope of coverage of "gross violations" of human rights
concerns the violations of both categories of rights: (1) civil and political rights,
and (2) social, economic, and cultural rights. But, there is a limitation within these
definitions to the extent that they seem to merely offer an enumeration of
violations that may constitute "gross violations" rather than supply the criteria to
assess the seriousness of the violations committed.19  In other words, those
definitions are descriptive rather than prescriptive of criteria necessary to evaluate
the gravity of the enumerated violation(s).20 In this regard, the U.N. Human Rights
Due Policy on U.N. Support to Non-U.N. Security Forces has recently provided a
"complex" definition of "gross violation" of human rights, which unifies different
legal regimes, such as international law, international humanitarian law, and
international criminal law. 21 But that definition is unclear as to what the terms
17. Definition of Gross and Large-scale Violations of Human Rights as an International Crime,
Comm. on Human Rights, Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Working paper
submitted by Mr. Stanislav Chemichenko in accordance with Sub-Comm. decision 1992/109, 14, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/10 (June 8, 1993).
18. According to Theo Van Boven, gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
include at least the following: genocide, slavery and slavery-like practices; summary or arbitrary
executions; torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; enforced disappearance;
arbitrary and prolonged detention; deportation or forcible transfer of population; and systematic
discrimination, in particular on race or gender. See, Theo Van Boven, Study Concerning the Right to
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report submitted by M. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, 7-8, U.N.
Doc No. E/CN4/Sub2/1993/8, (July 2, 1993). See also, MAX DU PLESIS & STEPHEN PETE, REPAIRING
THE PAST?: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON REPARATIONS FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 18
(2007).
19. Karimova, supra note 3, at 19.
20. Id. at 34.
21. Id. at 14. See also U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated February 25, 2013 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the
Security Council, A/67/775 (Mar. 5, 2013) [hereinafter the Human Rights Due Policy]. Paragraph 12 of
the Human Rights Due Policy stipulates:
"Grave violations" mean, for the purposes of the present policy:
(a) In the case of a unit:
(i) Commission of 'war crimes' or of 'crimes against humanity', as defined in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, or 'gross violations' of human rights, including
summary executions and extrajudicial killings, acts of torture, enforced disappearances,
enslavement, rape and sexual violence of a comparable serious nature, or acts ofrefoulement
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
"significant degree of frequency" or "significant scale" would actually mean in
practice.2 2 In light of the difficulty of defining the concept "gross violation" of
human rights, a more comprehensive definition should not only enumerate the
wrongful acts comprising "gross violations" of human rights, but also reflects
some standard so as to evaluate how a given wrongful act can be qualified as a
"gross violation." Accordingly, a more holistic definition can be formulated as
follows:
"Gross violation" of human ights comprises at least one the following
acts, when committed repetitively or non-repetitively against any
individual as part of a planned action by State actor(s) or non-state
actor(s), or committed without effective judicial measure(s) of the State
government to investigate and prosecute the perpetrator(s):
" Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment;
" Summary or arbitrary execution;
" Forced or involuntary disappearance, or arbitrary and prolonged
detention;
" Apartheid, discrimination based on gender, race, nationality, ethnicity,
language, culture, or religion;
* Human trafficking, slavery, or slavery-like practice;
" Foreign occupation or alien domination;
" Terrorism;
" Lack of the rule of law;
" Denial of access to education, food, or other socio-economic rights;
" Denial of access to free expression, public affairs, and services of the
country; and
under refugee law that are committed on a significant scale or with a significant degree of
frequency (that is, they are more than isolated or merely sporadic phenomena); or
(ii) A pattern of repeated violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee
law committed by a significant number of members of the unit; or
(iii) The presence in a senior command position of the unit of one or more officers about
whom there are substantial grounds to suspect:
- Direct responsibility for the commission of 'war crimes', 'gross violations' of human rights
or acts of refoulement; or
- Command responsibility, as defined in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, for the commission of such crimes, violations or acts by those under their
command; or
- Failure to take effective measures to prevent, repress, investigate or prosecute other
violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law committed on a
significant scale by those under their command;
(b) In the case of civilian or military authorities that are directly responsible for the
management, administration or command of non-United Nations security forces:
(i) Commission of grave violations by one or more units under their command;
(ii) Combined with a failure to take effective measures to investigate and prosecute the
violators.
22. Karimova, supra note 3, at 14; Human Rights Due Policy, supra note 21, 12 (a)(i), (a)(iii).
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* Destruction of properties or looting of a community's natural resources.
23
So what are the components that a wrongful act should have in order to rise to
the level of "gross violation" of human rights?
III. CRITERIA OF CLASSIFICATION OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Before answering the above question, it should be noted that as there is no
unanimous definition of "gross violation" of human rights under international law,
and there is no universally accepted method to assess whether or not a given act
should be evaluated as a "gross violation" of human rights. According to the
International Law Commission ("ILC")'s Commentary on Article 40 of the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, there are
two criteria in assessing whether the gravity of a given violation amounts to a
"gross violation" of human rights: the first concerns "the character of the
obligation breached," which derives from a peremptory norm of general
international law; the second involves "the intensity of the breach. 24  In reality,
the ILC's two-criteria tests can be regrouped into one criterion test: "the qualitative
criterion," which is subdivided into two segments: the nature of rights violated
(peremptory rights), and the character of the violation (cruelty of the breach).
However, this paper agrees with M. E. Tardu and Cecilia Medina Quiroga that four
elements should be present in order for a violation to be identified as a "gross
violation" of human rights,25  including: (1) the qualitative element, (2) the
23. This definition is suggested as a summary of all the above definitions, and it intends to fill the
gaps in terms of the criteria of evaluation of gross human rights violations.
24. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 282
(2001). Article 40 of the ILC's report to the General Assembly, which adopted the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Intemationally Wrongful Acts, provides:
I. This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious
breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international
law. 2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure
by the responsible State to fulfill the obligation.
Id. at art. 40.
Commenting on the above provision, the ILC noted that:
Article 40 serves to define the scope of the breaches covered by the chapter. It establishes
two criteria in order to distinguish "serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms
of general international law" from other types of breaches. The first relates to the character
of the obligation breached, which must derive from a peremptory norm of general
international law. The second qualifies the intensity of the breach, which must have been
serious in nature. Chapter Ill only applies to those violations of international law that fulfill
both criteria. The first criterion relates to the character of the obligation breached. In order
to give rise to the application of this chapter, a breach must concern an obligation arising
under a peremptory norm of general international law. In accordance with Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a peremptory norm of general international law
is one which is... "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Id. at 282 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. [hereinafter VCLTJ).
25. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 11. See Tardu, supra note 4, at 583-84.
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quantitative element, (3) the time element and (4) the planning element.26 These
are the criteria that are also reflected in the definition suggested above.
A. Qualitative Element
The qualitative criterion of "gross violation" of human rights has two
segments, namely (1) the type of the rights violated, and (2) the character of the
violation itself.27 First, concerning the type of the rights violated: to be considered
as "gross violation," a given violation should be assessed as to if or if not it
breaches a derogable right or non-derogable right. 28 The general understanding is
that a wrongful act can amount to a "gross violation of human rights" only if it
violates a non-derogable right.29 Of course, this test raises another debate on the
hierarchy of human rights, which will not be discussed in this paper. Yet, even if
human rights are indivisible and interdependent, some rights are part ofjus cogens
and can therefore be subjected to no derogation in terms of their protection.30 In
light of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Article 4(2))31, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Article 15(2))32 and the American Convention on Human
Rights (Article 27(2)) 3 3, the right to life, the right to be free from torture and other
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to be free from slavery
or servitude, and the right to be free from retroactive application of penal laws are
non-derogable. This means that those rights have to be protected in any
circumstances during times of peace and war. But under international and regional
jurisprudence, there are instances where tribunals have also upheld that some
26. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 11.
27. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 13; Karimova, supra note 3, at 16; Tardu, supra note 4, at 583-84.
28. Unlike the derogable rights, the non-derogable rights are the rights that cannot be
theoretically taken away or compromised. In light of most international and regional treaties, the non-
derogable rights include:
the right to life, the right to be free from torture and other inhumane or degrading treatment
or punishment, the right to be free from slavery or servitude, and the right to be free from
retroactive application of penal laws. These rights are also known as peremptory norms of
international law orjus cogens norms.
See U.N. TERMS,
http://unterm.un.org/dgaacs/unterm.nsf/8fa9420467601 c85256983007ca4d8/d4dbb9694e5b40da8525
751 b0077e882?OpenDocument (last visited June 24, 2015).
29. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 13; Karimova, supra note 3, at 16.
30. Koji Teraya, Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond.- From the
Perspective of Non-derogable Rights, 12 EJIL 917, 918-20 (2001). See RULE OF LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS PROJECT, Derogation From Human Rights Treaties in Situations of Emergency, GENEVA
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/derogationfrom-human-rights treaties in situations-of emergency.php (last
visited Oct. 13, 2015).
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, 1 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
32. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, 2, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
33. American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, 2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
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violations of derogable rights (such as the right to education, right to housing, right
to properties, or right to healthcare service) may amount to "gross violations" of
human rights. For instance, in the case on Armed Activities in the Territory of the
Congo (DRC v. Uganda), the ICJ ruled that acts of torture and other forms of
inhuman treatment (non-derogable rights), as well as the destruction of civilian
houses (derogable right), constituted massive violations of human rights of the
Congolese population. 34 Similarly in World Organization against Torture v. Zaire,
the African Commission also concluded that the violation of the right to education
(due to the closure of universities and secondary schools during two years)
amounted to "gross violations" of human rights.35
Second, in regards to the character of the violation, it is required that a given
violation must have a certain degree of seriousness or cruelty in order to be
described as a "gross violation" of human rights.36 Dinah Shelton noted that acts
of "gross violations" of human rights are "those that are particularly serious in
nature because of their cruelty or depravity." 37 In DRC v. Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda, the African Commission also assessed the cruel nature of the violation by
considering that:
The indiscriminate dumping of and mass burial of victims of the series
of massacres and killings perpetrated against the peoples of the eastern
province of the Complainant State.. .The [African] Commission further
finds these acts barbaric and in reckless violation of Congolese peoples'
rights to cultural development guaranteed by Article 22 of the African
Charter, and an affront on the noble virtues of the African historical
tradition and values enunciated in the preamble to the African Charter.
38
The African Commission made a similar assessment in its preceding ruling in
World Organization against Torture v. Zaire,39 where it had evaluated the
seriousness of the violation based on "[t]he failure of the government to provide
basic services necessary for a minimum standard of health, such as safe drinking
water and electricity and the shortage of medicine" to the victims. 40
34. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. at 206-07.
35. World Organization against Torture v. Zaire, Decision on Communication 25/89, 47/90,
56/91, 100/93, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Comm'n H.P.R.], 48 (Mar.
26-Apr. 4, 1996).
36. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 15; Karimova, supra note 3, at 17.
37. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 390(2006).
38. Democratic Republic of Cong v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, Decision 227/99, African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Comm'n H.P.R.], 87.
39. World Organization against Torture v. Zaire, Decision on Communication 25/89, 47/90,
56/91, 100/93, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Comm'n H.P.R.], 1 47
(March 26-Apr. 4, 1996).
40. Id.
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B. Quantitative Element
The qualitative element is not the only factor for a violation to amount to
"gross violation" of human rights; there is also the quantitative component that
relates to the quantity of violations (or rights or victims).4 ' The analysis of the
quantitative element leads to questions as to: How many wrongful acts are required
for violation(s) to be described as "gross violations"? Or, how many victims or
violated rights are required for violations to amount to "gross violations" of human
rights? And, can a single violation of a single right against an individual amount to
a "gross violation" of human rights? There is no international or regional legal
document that provides clear answers to these questions. But scholars agree that
the use of epithets such as "gross," "grave," "flagrant," "serious," "massive,"
"systematic," or "large-scale" by international legal documents and judicial bodies
may insinuate that there should be more than one violation (or individual) for a
given violation to equal a "gross violation" of human rights. 42 For instance, in its
ruling on the occurrence of "massive human rights violations" in the case
concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), the
ICJ also took into account the large number of victims and various rights violated.
The Court held that:
[T]he armed conflict between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in
Kisangani led to
"fighting spreading into residential areas and indiscriminate
shelling occurring for 6 days...
Over 760 civilians were killed, and an estimated 1,700 wounded.
More than 4,000 houses were partially damaged, destroyed or made
uninhabitable. Sixty-nine schools were shelled, and other public
buildings were badly damaged. Medical facilities and the cathedral
were also damaged during the shelling, and 65,000 residents were
forced to flee the fighting and seek refuge in nearby forests." 43
In Sudan Human Rights Organization and Centre on Housing Rights and
Evictions v. Sudan, the African Commission also observed that "[s]uch is the case
with the situation in the Darfur region, where tens of thousands of people have
allegedly been forcibly evicted and their properties destroyed. It is impracticable
and undesirable to expect these victims to exhaust the remedies claimed by the
State to be available."" The African Commission considered that the alleged
violations primafacie constituted "serious and massive violations ... ,45
From the above, it appears that the magnitude of the violations in terms of the
41. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 12.
42. Id.
43. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 1l 208.
44. Sudan Human Rights Organization and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions / Sudan,
Decision 279/03 - 297/05, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights [Afr. Comm'n H.P.R.],
101.
45. Id. 102.
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large number of victims and rights violated is an important factor in determining
whether or not the given violations amount to "gross violations" of human rights.
Yet the existence of more than one victim and violated right may not be the only
factor to examine when assessing the gravity of violations. This viewpoint seems
to be shared by the European Commission on Human Rights (European
Commission). Indeed, in Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Commission
upheld that: "Although one single act contrary to the Convention is sufficient to
establish a violation, it is evidence that the violation can be regarded as being more
serious if it is not simply one outstanding event but forms part of a number of
similar events which might even form a pattern. 4 6 In light of the European
Commission's ruling, a single violation may also be enough to constitute a "gross
violation" of human rights,47 and the existence of numerous violations is not a
condition sine qua non for establishing "gross violations" of human rights.48
Cecilia Medina Quiroga has also noted that the quantitative element of "gross
violations" of human rights can have a link with the status of victim(s). She
writes: "it is possible that a smaller number of victims is required to arrive at a
situation of gross, systematic violations of human rights, when the violation of
human rights is committed against certain individuals important to the national
community or to a specific section of the population."
49
A situation where the existence of one violation or victim is enough to
amount to a "gross violation" of human rights can also be illustrated through the
following hypothetical example: Assume that a Mr. X is a community leader in the
region Z where he often campaigns against the enlistment of the youths of his
community into jihadist groups and that the members of a jihadist group Y have
publically decapitated Mr. X because of his opposition to their movement. In this
hypothesis, there is "gross violation" of human rights even if one is in the presence
of a single violation (decapitation of an individual impeding the right to life)
committed against one victim (who is a community leader). In this example, there
would still be "gross violation" of human rights even if Mr. X were regular citizen
rather than a community leader. This is because of not only the nature of the right
violated but also the brutality of the act itself which reflects a higher degree of
cruelty aiming to terrorize the entire community rather than ending the life of an
opponent. In the same context, the U.N. and Lebanon established in 2006 the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon to specially adjudicate the act of terrorism (which is
one of the acts constituting "gross violations" of human rights) committed against
the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Harii in particular, and twenty-one
other people in a single event.
50
46. Karimova, supra note 3, at 17 (quoting Ireland v. UK, 1977 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H. R. 762
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)(emphasis added)).
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id. at 18.
49. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 15.
50. See S.C. Res. 1757, annex, Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese
Republic on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (May 30, 2007).
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
C. Element of Time
The element of time is another essential component to evaluate the
seriousness of a violation. According to the U.N. Economic and Social Council
("ECOSOC") Resolution 1503(XLVIII), a given violation should have a
"consistent pattern." 51  This idea of pattern seems also to run through the
provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 52 and the
United States Foreign Relations regulations. 53  The term "consistent pattern"
implies a certain repetition of the violation's occurrence over a period of time. 54 In
the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v.
Uganda), the ICJ also examined the repeated occurrence of violations against the
DRC's population by observing that: "The armed conflict between Ugandan and
Rwandan forces in [the DRC's province of] Kisangani led to 'fighting spreading
into residential areas and indiscriminate shelling occurring for 6 days' . . . ."" The
Uganda People's Defense Forces ("UPDF") also carried out widespread bombing
and destruction of hundreds of villages from 2000 to 2002.56
In its judgment in Ireland v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR considered the
repetitive nature of the violations by upholding that: "A practice incompatible with
51. Economic and Social Council Res. 1503(XLVIII), I M 1, 5 (May 27, 1970) (requesting that the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to consider
communications and replies of governments that "appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and
reliably attested violations of human rights...")
52. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
"[Clrimes against humanity" means any of the following acts committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against an identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious or gender..
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Id. at art. 7.
53. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (2012) ("Except under circumstances specified in this section, no
security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.").
54. Tardu, supra note 4, at 583; QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 12, Karimova, supra note 3, at 15.
55. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
2005 I.C.J. 1 208. See also id 204-207.
56. Id. 1206.
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the Convention consists of an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches
which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to
isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system; a practice does not of
itself constitute a violation separate from such breaches."
57
In view of the above rulings, one may wonder if a one-time, unrepeated
violation could also be qualified as a "gross violation" of human rights. This is a
pertinent question. Despite the fact that many cases of "gross violations" of human
rights happened to be repetitively committed during a certain period of time, some
scholars have commented that the international quasi-judicial bodies have never
concluded that there should be a systematic occurrence of a violation in order for it
to be perceived as a "gross violation" of human rights. 58 In Prosecutor v. Salim
Jamil Ayyash and others, the Trial Chamber of Special Tribunal for Lebanon
issued a warrant of arrest against the accused persons for perpetrating a terrorist act
committed as a single violation on a single day (14 February 2005) against the
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Harir and others. 59  Likewise, the
hypothetical example posited above also demonstrates how an unrepeated violation
can also meet the definition of "gross violation" of human rights.
In light of this, the assessment of the gravity of violations should therefore
depend on the particularity of each case no matter whether or not the wrongful act
was committed repetitively.
60
D. Element of Planning
The term "consistent pattern," which was used through the ECOSOC
Resolution 1503 to establish a violation as a "gross violation" of human rights, can
also imply the existence of an element of planning. 61 Accordingly, E.M. Tardu
notes that acts of "gross violations" of human rights have "an element of planning
or of sustained will on the part of the perpetrators. ' ' f2 For Cecilia Medina Quiroga,
the term "gross violation" or "systematic violation" also suggests an element of
planning. 63 In the Blaskic case, the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
(ITFY) ruled that the term "systematic" refers to "the existence of a political
objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack is perpetrated or an ideology, in the
broad sense of the word, that is, to destroy, persecute or weaken a community."
64
In the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v.
57. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1977 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H. R. 159.
58. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 12. See also Karimova, supra note 3, at 6.
59. E.g., Prosecutor v. Ayyash, STL-I 1-01/T/TC, Warrant For The Arrest Of Hussein Hassan
Oneissi, (April 17, 2014).
60. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 12.
61. Id. at 15. See also Rome Statute, supra note 51 at art. 8, . 1 ("The Court shall have
jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimes.").
62. Tardu, supra note 4, at 583.
63. QUIROGA, supra note 4, at 15.
64. Prosecutor v. Bla[ki], IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 203 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
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Uganda), the ICJ observed that Uganda began providing military supports to the
DRC's rebel groups in January 1999 and March 1999,65 and that "the UPDF
[Uganda People's Defense Forces] incited ethnic conflicts and took no action to
prevent such conflicts in Ituri district .... [t]he confrontations ... resulted in some
10,000 deaths and the displacement of some 50,000 people ...,,66
In other words, Uganda's incitement of ethnic violence and supplying of the
DRC's armed groups with weapons, coupled with its inaction to stop ethnic
conflicts, may denote the existence of a plan intended to destroy and destabilize the
DRC's community.
E. Failure of Undertaking Judiciary and other Actions
Besides the presence of elements of quality, quantity, time, and planning, the
seriousness of a violation can also be assessed in considering the failure of the
government to implement judiciary actions to prosecute the perpetrators of the
violation and/or to take other measures to prevent the continual occurrence of
atrocities. As discussed above in the case concerning Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), Uganda's behaviour was also
ascertained as a "gross violation" of human rights due to its failure to take
appropriate actions to prevent the killings and massacres of the DRC's
population.6 7 Prior to that ICJ decision, the ECtHR had adopted a similar position.
In Velikova v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR considered that Bulgaria's:
[U]nexplained failure to undertake indispensable and obvious
investigative steps is to be treated with particular vigilance. In such a
case, failing a plausible explanation by the Government as to the reasons
why indispensable acts of investigation have not been performed, the
State's responsibility is engaged for a particularly serious violation of its
obligation under Article 2 of the Convention [to protect the right to
life]. 68
With regards to the above ruling, it also seems that it is not necessary that a
violation be committed by the state's organs in order for it to amount to a "gross
violation" of human rights. This means that acts of "gross violations" which are
committed even by non-state actors (such as ISIS or Boko Haram) can be
attributed to the government if it negligently failed to prosecute and prevent the
occurrence of these wrongful acts.
In conclusion, the terms "gross," "grave," "flagrant," "serious," or "massive"
are used interchangeably and even cumulatively by international legal documents
and quasi-judicial bodies. There is no unanimously accepted definition of "gross
violations" of human rights, which consist of the violations of civil rights, political
65. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J.
Rep. 1681141.
66. Id. 1 209.
67. Seeid. 11211.
68. Velikova v. Bulgaria, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20. See also Eremiasova v. Czech Republic,
2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 132.
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rights, and socio-economic rights. And, the seriousness of violations is assessed
on the basis of several factors, including: the type of violated rights and the
character of the violation, the quantity of victims, the repeated occurrence of the
violation and its planning, and the failure of the government to appropriate
measures to prevent and punish the violation. In view of this, the cases on armed
conflicts in the DRC can be perceived as meeting all the suggested criteria of
"gross violations" of human rights.
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